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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Isaac D. Swensen
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2013
Title: Essays on the Economics of Health and Education
I present empirical research considering the response of health and educational
outcomes to alcohol consumption, drug abuse, and collegiate athletics. Chapter II
considers the effect of legal access to alcohol on student achievement. The empirical
approach identifies the effect through changes in students’ performance after gaining
legal access to alcohol, controlling flexibly for the expected evolution of grades as
students make progress towards their degrees. The estimates indicate that students’
grades fall below their expected levels upon being able to drink legally but by less
than previously documented.
Chapter III considers the relationship between collegiate-football success and
non-athlete student performance. The findings indicate that the team’s success
significantly reduces male grades relative to female grades and only in fall quarters,
which coincides with the football season. Survey data suggest that males are more
likely than females to increase alcohol consumption, decrease studying, and increase
partying in response to the success of the team. Yet, females also report that their
behavior is affected by athletic success, suggesting that their performance is likely
impaired but that this effect is masked by the practice of grade curving.
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Finally, chapter IV considers the effect of substance-abuse treatment on drug-
overdose deaths. Though the provision of substance-abuse treatment may be an
effective way to reduce drug abuse, whether it has a causal effect on drug-related
mortality has not been documented. I analyze the effect of substance-abuse treatment
on mortality by exploiting county-level variation in treatment facilities driven by
facility openings and closings. The estimates indicate that a 10-percent increase in
facilities lowers a county’s drug-induced mortality rate by 2 percent. The results
also suggest that spillovers of treatment reduce other causes of death related to drug
abuse.
As a whole, this body of research offers insight into the economic impact of
behaviors involving drinking and other substance use.
This dissertation includes previously published co-authored material.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the subsequent chapters, I present empirical research considering questions
related to the economics of health and education. While each chapter addresses
a distinct research question, together the findings contribute to a broad discussion
on the economic impact of behaviors involving drinking and other substance use.
Chapters II and III represent co-authored work and also appear as publications in
peer-reviewed academic journals. Below I summarize each chapter and discuss the
primary findings.
In Chapter II, we consider the effect of legal access to alcohol on student
achievement. Our preferred approach identifies the effect through changes in one’s
performance after gaining legal access to alcohol, controlling flexibly for the expected
evolution of grades as one makes progress towards their degree. We also report RD-
based estimates but argue that an RD design is not well suited to the research question
in our setting. We find that students’ grades fall below their expected levels upon
being able to drink legally, but by less than previously documented. We also show
that there are effects on women and that the effects are persistent. Using the 1997
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we show that students drink more often after
legal access but do not consume more drinks on days on which they drink.
Chapter III considers the relationship between collegiate-football success and
non-athlete student performance. We find that the team’s success significantly
reduces male grades relative to female grades, and only in fall quarters, which
coincides with the football season. Using survey data, we find that males are more
likely than females to increase alcohol consumption, decrease studying, and increase
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partying in response to the success of the team. Yet, females also report that their
behavior is affected by athletic success, suggesting that their performance is likely
impaired but that this effect is masked by the practice of grade curving.
Finally, In Chapter IV I examine the effect of substance-abuse treatment on
drug-related mortality. Drug-overdose deaths, which have more than doubled over
the past decade, represent a growing public-health concern. Though the provision of
substance-abuse treatment may be an effective way to reduce drug abuse, whether it
has a causal effect on drug-related mortality has not been documented. Given the
stigma associated with treatment, low completion rates, high risk of relapse, and that
many patients are referrals from the criminal justice system, the effect of treatment is
not obvious a priori. In this chapter, I analyze the effect of substance-abuse treatment
on mortality by exploiting county-level variation in treatment facilities driven by
facility openings and closings. The estimates indicate that a 10-percent increase
in facilities lowers a county’s drug-induced mortality rate by 2 percent. Moreover,
the estimates suggest significant benefits of treatment facilities across a range of
individual and county characteristics, though the effect is especially large among
racial minorities, in urban counties, and in counties with low per-capita incomes.
The results also suggest that spillovers of treatment reduce other causes of death
related to drug abuse.
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CHAPTER II
ALCOHOL AND STUDENT PERFORMANCE: ESTIMATING THE EFFECT
OF LEGAL ACCESS
This work was published in Volume 32, Issue 1 of the Journal of Health Economics
in January 2013. Jason Lindo, Isaac Swensen, and Glen Waddell were the principle
investigators for this work.
Introduction
A large literature links alcohol consumption to adverse health and social
outcomes.1 Given long-standing and persistent efforts to restrict access to alcohol,
it is no surprise that this topic has received considerable attention from researchers.
However, relatively little is known about the effect of legal access to alcohol on the
academic performance of students in college, where binge drinking is often cited as a
serious and growing problem (DeSimone 2007). That alcohol is associated with acute
outcomes such as crime, mortality, and sexual activity gives cause for concern that
the effect on student performance may be quite large.
In this paper, we assess the effect of legal access to alcohol on academic
performance using two identification strategies. The first has been used to address this
research question in a different setting and the second has not, but both approaches
exploit the exogenous change in legality induced by the federally mandated minimum
1In particular, quasi-experimental methods have been used to consider effects on mortality
(Dee 1999; Carpenter 2004; Carpenter and Dobkin 2009), crime (Markowitz and Grossman 1998;
Carpenter 2005a; Carpenter 2007; Carpenter and Dobkin 2010), sexual activity (Chesson, Harrison,
and Kassler 2000; Rees and Argys 2001; Sen 2002; Rashad 2004; Carpenter 2005b; Waddell 2012),
employment (Mullahy and Sindelar 1996; Terza 2002; Dave and Kaestner 2002; MacDonald 2004,
Renna 2008), and teenagers’ educational outcomes (Cook and Moore 1993; Dee and Evans 2003;
Chatterji and DeSimone 2006), among others.
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legal drinking age (MLDA). Our first identification strategy follows Carrell, Hoekstra,
and West (2011) who exploit the sharp change in legality that occurs at age 21 in
a regression discontinuity (RD) framework to estimate the effect of legal access on
student performance. While it is relatively straightforward to use an RD design
to estimate effects of turning 21 on crime or traffic accidents, as in Carpenter and
Dobkin’s works, it is less straightforward as an approach to estimating effects on
academic outcomes since they are not measured frequently. For this reason, the RD
approach uses age from 21 at the end of the academic term as the running variable.
As such, the estimates capture the effect of legal access to alcohol for students who
obtain access near the end of the academic term. In the limit, the thought experiment
compares the performance of students who turn 21 the day before their final exam to
the performance of students who turn 21 on the day of their final exam. The resulting
estimates can therefore be characterized as measuring a local average treatment effect,
which may have limited external validity.
Our second and preferred identification strategy overcomes this limitation by
making use of the longitudinal nature of the data. In particular, we identify the effect
of legal access to alcohol by comparing a student’s post-21 academic performance to
his own pre-21 academic performance with individual-fixed effects models—implicitly
arguing that the best counterfactual for a student’s post-21 performance is his own
performance prior to turning 21. In addition, our regressions include fixed effects for
the number of accumulated credits to account for the possibility that students may
systematically improve, “slack off,” or experience classes of different difficulty as they
progress towards degree completion. Although it is not typical for researchers to be
able to separately identify effects of experience (or accumulated credits in our case)
and the effects of age (or an age-dependent treatment in our case), we can do so in our
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context by leveraging the variation in college starting ages.2 As in the first approach,
we use a student’s course performance relative to their classmates’ as our outcome
variable, which will also serve to control for selection into courses.3
The data and institutional setting that we consider—transcript-level data from
undergraduates at the University of Oregon—allow us to make several additional
contributions to the literature. One of the unique features of Carrell, Hoekstra,
and West’s (2011) study using data from the U.S. Air Force Academy is that
the prohibition on underage drinking is taken extremely seriously there—much
more so than in most other institutional settings, where enforcement is more lax
and punishment less severe.4 As such, assuming Air Force Academy students are
representative of the general student population, their RD estimates tell us about
the local average treatment effect of prohibition in environments where enforcement
and penalties are unusually strict. In contrast, our results are more likely to speak
to the effect of minimum drinking age laws as they are conventionally enforced and,
in turn, the effect of the changes in drinking behavior that are typically associated
2As an alternative to our preferred models that control for accumulated-credit fixed effects, we
have also estimated models that instead control for the age profile of student grades. Whereas the
former relies on the assumption that the effects of progress are similar for those with and those
without legal access, this alternative approach relies on the assumption that the age profile of grades
is well captured by the chosen parametric specification. The estimates based on both approaches
are statistically significant. The estimates based on the accumulated-credit fixed effects models,
however, are more conservative.
3In related studies, Williams, Powell, Wechsler (2003) and Powell, Williams, and Wechsler (2004)
consider the effect of alcohol consumption on college GPAs using data from the Harvard School
of Public Health’s College Alcohol Study. These studies involve cross-institution comparisons of
student GPAs, with measures of alcohol costs serving as instruments for drinking intensity among
those who drink. Kremer and Levy (2008) consider a different-but-related question, exploiting the
random assignment of roommates at a large state university in order to identify the effect of having
a roommate who drinks. Finally, Lindo, Swensen, and Waddell (forthcoming) consider how non-
athlete academic performance varies with collegiate football success and provide survey evidence of
increased alcohol consumption and partying associated with football success.
4Carrell, Hoekstra, and West (2011) highlight this feature, pointing to the fact that two incidents
of underage drinking at the Air Force Academy resulted in expulsion and that some related incidents
(e.g., driving under the influence) have also resulted in expulsion.
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with legal access to alcohol. As we describe in the next section, the University of
Oregon is also more representative of U.S. institutions, which leaves us more confident
that estimates based on these data will have greater external validity. Further, our
data include over four times the number of observations used in this earlier research,
and approximately ten times the number of females which allows a more-precise
consideration of heterogeneity across gender.
The results from our preferred approach indicate that students’ grades fall below
their expected levels by approximately 0.03 standard deviations upon being able to
drink legally, a modest amount compared to the 0.06 to 0.13 standard-deviation effect
estimated in earlier research. The effect is statistically significant, manifests in the
term a student turns 21, and persists into later academic terms. In addition, we find
that the effects on academic performance are especially large for females, low-ability
males, and males who are most likely from financially disadvantaged backgrounds.
In order to shed light on the mechanisms underlying these effects, we also analyze
the effects of legal alcohol access on various drinking-related behaviors among students
enrolled in four-year colleges using data from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY97). This analysis reveals that college students drink more often
upon gaining legal access but do not consume more drinks on days in which they
drink.5
5Though the NLSY97 also includes information on GPAs in college, these data have several
shortcomings that preclude an analysis similar to that which we perform on our transcript data.
Most crucially, the NLSY97 does not offer transcript data on academic performance but instead
has retrospective self-reports of GPA by term, leaving much opportunity for measurement error. In
particular, in each survey, the students are asked about their GPAs in all academic terms since they
were last surveyed. This time period most frequently spans one year but sometimes spans several.
Possibly as a result of this survey design, there are also many cases in which it appears as if the
performance in a given term may have been reported more than once (in different survey years).
Moreover, several features of these data make it difficult to accurately assign whether the student
had legal access to alcohol in a given term. Specifically, the month and year in which the term
began can be recorded but information on term length is more often missing than not. In our best
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss the data
used in our analysis as well as the representative nature of the University of Oregon
campus. In Section 2.3 we present an RD strategy, following existing literature,
and our preferred longitudinal approach to identifying the influence of legal access to
alcohol on academic performance. In Section 2.4 we present and discuss the empirical
results, including our analysis of how college students’ drinking-related behaviors
change upon gaining legal access to alcohol based on the NLSY97. We conclude and
discuss the implications of our results in Section 4.8.
Data
Our primary data are administrative student-course level data from the
University of Oregon, spanning fall 1999 to winter 2007, for students entering at 18
or 19 years old. We focus on performance during the fall, winter, and spring terms.6
Because our identification strategies use variation provided by the federal MLDA law,
we also restrict the sample to students observed at least one term in which they are at
least 21 years old. The resulting sample consists of 479,342 observations over 13,102
students.
As one contribution of this paper is to provide insight into the effects of MLDA
laws in a “typical-college setting,” Table 1 (see appendix A for figures and tables)
compares characteristics of students at the University of Oregon to those at other U.S.
public four-year institutions. While Column 1 provides summary statistics based on
our sample, Column 2 considers a more comprehensive set of characteristics based on
attempts to impute the data where necessary, NLSY97 data yield a point estimate that is negative
(suggesting a negative effect of legal access on GPAs) but not statistically significant.
6One reason for excluding summer terms is that summer enrollment could itself be considered an
outcome variable. In addition, summer terms tend to be fundamentally different from other terms in
class size, course offerings, student attendance, teacher and student attributes, and term structure.
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data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). Similarly,
Column 3 shows statistics on other public four-year institutions, also using data from
IPEDS.7
Table 1 largely supports that the University of Oregon provides a representative-
college setting. While it is twice the size and has higher admission rates than the
average public four-year institution, it is similar in terms of enrollment rates and
in the ability of enrolled students as measured by SAT scores. It is also similar to
the average college in terms of costs and financial aid. Like most other institutions,
the University of Oregon is over half female and predominately white, although at
seventy-five percent it has a larger share of white students than average.8
In contrast, the U.S. Air Force Academy, the only other institution where this
research question has been addressed, offers a relatively unique setting. In addition to
being highly selective, it is very different from most schools in terms of its students’
objectives. In particular, all students at the Air Force Academy are given full
scholarships but are expected to serve a five-year commitment as a commissioned
officer in the U.S. Air Force following graduation. Moreover, females comprise only
eighteen percent of its student body, which stands in stark contrast to the nation-wide
average of fifty-five percent. As mentioned in the introduction, it is also important
to note that the Air Force Academy is an outlier in strongly enforcing the MLDA
law. That students at the Air Force Academy are such a select group from the
distribution of all students, in both ability and preferences, and that they are in an
7In comparing across institutions we have used variables that provide a snapshot of school
admissions and graduation rates, general academic standards, undergraduate student demographics,
and student financial costs and aid. The statistics reported in columns 2 and 3 are based primarily
on the 2003-2004 academic year, which is close to the median year for our data.
8Also like most other large public institutions, a majority freshman at the University of Oregon
live on campus (87 percent) while sophomores, juniors, and seniors do not often live on campus (7,
3, and 2 percent, respectively).
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environment that is unusually strict with respect to underage drinking, gives cause for
concern about the external validity of earlier estimates and highlights the importance
of considering the research question in different contexts.
Our secondary data source is a subsample of respondents from the 1997 National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97), which allows us to speak to the sensitivity
of alcohol consumption to legality among college goers. To the extent possible, our
sample restrictions on these data reflect those above. In particular, we restrict the
NLSY97 sample to individuals who report being currently enrolled in a four-year
college, who were first observed in college at age 18 or 19, and also observed in college
after turning 21.9 We also balance the sample by removing observations when any
of the outcome variables we consider (described below) are missing. Ultimately, the
sample spans 1998 to 2009, includes 2,298 person observations and 9,023 person-
year observations. Summary statistics for the NLSY97 data are provided in the
last column of Table 1. Like the University of Oregon, the NLSY97 offers a sample
that is similar in ability to the broader group of students attending four-year public
institutions and its gender composition, but differs in some important ways in its
racial composition. In particular, like the University of Oregon, it provides a sample
that is disproportionately white; however, whereas the University of Oregon has very
relatively few black students, the NLSY97 has relatively few Asian students.
9An individual’s age at the time of the interview is based on the interview date along with the
individual’s month and year of birth. We impute the fifteenth as the day of birth. Though this will
lead some person-year observations to be misclassified in terms of legal access, few observations are
on the margin for this to make a difference. 3,790 observations are classified as having legal access
when the fifteenth of the month is imputed as the day of birth; this count becomes 3,827 and 3,719,
respectively, if the first or twenty-eighth of the month are used instead.
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Empirical Strategy
RD-Based Approach
Following the prior literature, we begin by estimating the effect of having had
one’s 21st birthday before the end of the academic term on academic performance
using the following regression equation:
Gijt = α0 + α11{AGEit ≥ 0}+ f(AGEit) + ijt, (2.1)
where Gijt is the normalized grade for student i in class j in term t. Normalized grades
are calculated as the deviation in a student’s grade from the class mean divided by
the class standard deviation. AGEit is the student’s age at the end of the term in
days, centered on 21 years. For example, in the comparison of means as estimates
approach the treatment threshold from each side, a bandwidth of 90 days would put
weight on all students who had their 21st birthday in the range 90 days prior to the
end of the term (i.e., AGE = 90) through 90 days after the end of the term (i.e.,
AGE = −90). Last, f(AGEit) controls for a student’s age at the end of the term in
a flexible manner. In practice, we estimate a variety of models, including those that
do not control for age at the end of the term, those that control for age at the end of
the term with a linear specification flexible on each side of the cutoff, and those that
control for age at the end of the term with a quadratic specification flexible on each
side of the cutoff. Further, we consider a variety of bandwidths between 20 days and
240 days.
It is important to note that this identification strategy departs from the usual
RD exercise. Typically, we observe—or know as a result of institutional detail—
the extent to which the treatment of interest jumps on the “treatment side” of
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the threshold. For example, in DiNardo and Lee’s (2004) unionization study, all
elections with union support greater than fifty percent lead to unionization while
elections with less support do not. Similarly, in Angrist and Lavy’s (1999) class-size
study, we observe class-size reductions above multiples of forty enrolled students. Our
example is similar insofar as all students on the “treatment side” of the threshold have
had the opportunity to drink alcohol legally prior to the conclusion of the academic
term. However, because the underlying effects on drinking behavior is unobserved,
the magnitude of any estimated effect will be somewhat difficult to interpret. Even
though drinking tends to increase when a student turns 21, as we show in Section
2.4, we do not know to what extent this holds true for students who turn 21 near the
end of an academic term, which this identification strategy pre-supposes. As such,
the comparison involved with this RD approach is informative about the effect of
drinking on college performance but its “local” nature (close to 21 and close to the
end of the term) introduces additional interpretive challenges.10
In the absence of estimated effects on drinking behavior for such a sample,
the results are appropriately characterized as intent-to-treat effects, measuring the
reduced-form effect of the minimum-drinking-age law. While this is certainly of
interest in itself, the RD design only provides an estimate of a very local intent-
to-treat effect, corresponding to students gaining legal access to alcohol at the end
of the academic term. This will remain a disadvantage of the RD approach in this
setting, something that we improve on with the identification strategy presented in
the next section where we exploit the longitudinal nature of the data.
10We note that all RD-based studies that consider the effect of being able to drink legally are local
in the first (close to 21) sense but that the second sense is specific to this application, driven by the
fact that outcomes are not measured daily.
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Individual Fixed Effects Approach
Our preferred approach to estimating the effects of legal access to alcohol focuses
on within-student variation over time. Although we first present estimates from more-
parsimonious models, we ultimately arrive at estimates derived from the following
regression:
Gijt = θAGE21it + βXijt + αi + uijt, (2.2)
where Gijt is the normalized grade for student i in class j in term t, AGE21it is
an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the student could drink legally at
any time during term t and zero otherwise, Xijt can include term- or class-varying
individual characteristics, αi are a set of individual fixed effects, and uijt is a random
error term. In our analysis of transcript data from the University of Oregon, we
always include “experience controls” in Xijt, i.e., fixed effects for the number of
accumulated credits (in four-credit intervals) to control for grade changes that are
expected as a student progresses toward degree completion.11 For example, these
variables are intended to control for phenomena such as “senioritis.” As such, the
estimation strategy compares a student’s grades after turning 21 to what would be
expected based on his average prior performance and accumulated experience.12 This
approach relies on the assumption that accumulated experience has a similar effect
on grades before and after a student turns 21. As an alternative to fixed effects
for accumulated credits, one might anticipate that we would model the age profile
11While it would be attractive to also include fixed effects for the number of terms a student has
been at the university, doing so is likely to introduce problems of multicollinearity in conjunction
with the individual fixed effects and accumulated-credits fixed effects since there is little variation
in credits attempted each term. For example, such a model would be impossible to estimate if all
students earned 12 credits each term. We have explored models that include fixed effects for the
number of terms a student has been at the university instead of the accumulated-credits fixed effects
and the results are quite similar.
12We also estimate models that control for course characteristics.
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of academic performance, and consider deviations from the predicted grade upon
turning 21 as a reflection of the causal effect of legal access to alcohol. Each of these
two approaches offers conceptual advantages and both support our conclusions. We
limit the presentation and discussion of the results to the former approach, which
yields the more-conservative estimates.
Our approach to estimating the effect of legal alcohol access on drinking behavior
in the NLSY97 is quite similar with the exception of the controls we include in the
model. In particular, since the data are at the individual-by-survey-year level (asking
about drinking behavior “in the past 30 days”) as opposed to the term-level, we
estimate the effects using the model that controls for age at the time of the interview
with a quadratic as opposed to the number of credits that the student has acquired
in college.13
Results
In this section, we first present RD-based estimates of the effects of legal access
on academic grades using Oregon transcript data. We then we report the results from
our preferred approach—fixed-effect based estimates—of the same. Finally, we report
on the NLSY97 analyses, where we estimate the response of alcohol consumption and
drinking behavior to legalization.
13One could conceivably control for accumulated credits using the NLSY97, but the the number
of credits a student has taken in each term is often missing. Moreover, lacking the ability to track
transfers from school to school and to determine how many classes have been passed or failed, we
would not expect such a measure to reflect true progress towards degree completion. Thus, we rely
on the assumption that the age profile of drinking behavior is well captured by the chosen parametric
specification.
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RD-Based Estimates using Transcript Data
Panel A of Table 2 presents RD-based estimates of the effect of legal access to
alcohol at the end of a term on academic performance. Across the fourteen columns,
the table shows estimates based on a wide range of bandwidths and functional-form
choices. While the upper portion of this panel reports unadjusted estimates, the lower
portion reports estimates that controls for course-by-quarter-by-year fixed effects,
birth-year fixed effects, accumulated-credits fixed effects, gender, math and verbal
SAT scores, high-school GPA, and indicator variables for university athletes, private
high school attendance, race, and ethnicity.14
Overall, the set of results in Panel A of Table 2 suggests that turning 21 before
the end of a term has a negative impact on a student’s grades. While the point
estimates vary somewhat from specification to specification and are sensitive to
control variables, they are routinely negative and suggest that students who turn
21 prior to the end of the quarter score roughly 0.03 to 0.05 standard deviations
lower than those who turn 21 after the quarter ends. However, the sensitivity
of RD estimates to the inclusion of controls—primarily the inclusion of individual
characteristics and accumulated credits—casts doubt on the validity of this strategy
in our setting.
As a further robustness check, panels B and C of Table 2 report the results from
a similar exercise that instead considers the effect of turning 20 and 22, respectively,
before a quarter ends. In particular, these results test for a more-general “birthday
effect” which would raise the concern that the estimates in Panel A might reflect a
“21st birthday effect” that cannot be separated from the effect of gaining legal access
14Race and ethnicity controls consists of a set of indicator variables for being black, Hispanic, or
Asian.
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to alcohol. Although the estimates are usually not significant, the fact that 51 of the
56 point estimates are negative casts further doubt on the validity of this strategy in
our setting. If we believe that the estimated “20th birthday effect” or “22nd birthday
effect” provides a good estimate for the “21st birthday effect independent of legal
access,” then the difference between Panel A and either Panel B or Panel C can be
interpreted as the effect of legal access at the end of the term. Given the marginal
significance of most of the estimates in Panel A and the consistently negative estimates
in panels B and C, this approach would not produce convincing evidence that legal
access at the end of the academic term significantly reduces grades.15
Fixed-Effects Estimates using Transcript Data
In this section, we present our main results followed by a consideration of the
possible dynamic response to being able to drink legally (Section 4.2.2), and the
heterogeneity of the established results by gender, ability, and financial need (Section
4.2.3).
Main Results
In Table 3 we present our main results, making use of the longitudinal nature
of the data. In Column 1, we show the estimated effect based on a regression of a
student’s normalized grade on an indicator for whether a student could drink legally at
any time during the term. Because we anticipate that relatively low ability students
15Carrell, Hoekstra, and West (2011) conduct a similar analysis using alternative age cutoffs and
find no evidence of 20th or 22nd birthday effects at the U.S. Air Force Academy. In an alternative
attempt to separate the birthday effect from that of a potentially-persistent effect of legal access
to alcohol we have also explored the use of a donut-RD approach (Carpenter and Dobkin, 2009;
Barreca, Guldi, Lindo, and Waddell, 2011; Barreca, Lindo and Waddell, 2011). In particular, we
have conducted a similar analysis after dropping observations 1, 2, 3, 10, and 15 days to either
side of the cutoff. This analysis continued to show similar estimates when considering the effect of
turning 20 and 21.
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will be observed more often at older ages (as they take longer to complete their
degrees), we anticipate that this approach will overstate the negative effect of legal
access to alcohol. After we control for ability and other unobservable characteristics
with the inclusion of individual fixed effects, the estimate is indeed much smaller
(falling from -0.146 to -0.097 from Column 1 to Column 2). However, estimates in
Column 2 may still suffer from bias due to the potential for grades to fall as students
progress towards their degrees while they become increasingly likely to be 21 years
old. As anticipated, the magnitude of the estimate is even smaller when we remove
this source of bias by controlling for a student’s accumulated credits with fixed effects.
That said, the point estimate (shown in Column 3) remains statistically significant
at the one-percent level, indicating that a student’s course-normalized grades fall
by 0.033 standard deviations after they gain legal access to alcohol relative to what
we would expect based on their prior performance and accumulated experience. The
estimated effect is identical when we add controls for subject-by-level fixed effects and
term fixed effects in Column 4, which is not surprising since our outcome variable is
normalized at the class level.16
In order to better understand our main results in Table 3, in Table 4 we explore
the effects of legal access on additional academic outcomes. To begin, we consider
the distributional effects of legal alcohol access on grades. In particular, we use linear
probability models (with the same controls used in the richest specification of Table
3) to separately estimate the effect of of legal alcohol access on the probability that
a student earns an A grade, a B grade, a C grade, and a D or F grade, respectively.
These estimates suggest that the negative effect of legal alcohol access on grades
16For these fixed effects, subjects correspond to economics, english, and mathematics. Levels
correspond to either 100-, 200-, 300-, or 400-level classes. As summer terms are not considered as
part of our analysis, terms are fall, winter, and spring.
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overall is driven by its negative effect on the probability that a student earns an A
grade and its positive effect on the probability that a student earns a C grade. The
estimated effects on B grades and failing grades are negligible.17
Although the estimates in Table 3 address omitted variable bias that might be
induced by effects on course-taking behavior by normalizing students’ grades relative
to their classmates and by controlling for course characteristics, any effect on course
selection is of interest itself. We explore this issue columns 5 and 6 of Table 4,
considering the effect of legal alcohol access on course difficulty and course loads.
This analysis is identical to the preceding analysis, except that it is conducted at the
student-by-quarter level rather than the student-by-quarter-by-course level and, as
such, omits course-level controls.
As our measure of course difficulty, we focus on a student’s unconditional
“expected” GPA. This is calculated based on the average grades in the most-recent
offerings of the courses a student has enrolled in for their current quarter. The
estimated effect on this outcome is 0.009, which suggests that students take slightly
easier classes upon turning 21—a small and statistically significant effect on course-
taking behavior. However, as we show in the final column of Table 4, there is no
evidence that students take more or fewer credits upon gaining legal access to alcohol.
17We have also estimated the effect on the probability that a student earns a quarterly GPA weakly
above 2.0 (i.e., the GPA that would imply probation) and the probability that a student earns a
quarterly GPA above 3.75 (i.e., the GPA that would imply Dean’s List membership). These results
indicate that legal access does not affect the probability that a student earns a 3.75 but increases
the probability that a student is placed on academic probation, with point estimates (and standard
errors) of -0.003 (0.002) and 0.019 (0.002), respectively. In addition, we have separately estimated
the effects on grades in classes taken within a student’s major and outside of a student’s major.
These results reveal larger effects for courses taken outside a student’s major, with point estimates
(and standard errors) of -0.058 (0.007) and -0.023 (0.009), respectively. Finally, we do not find any
evidence that legal access affects the probability that students repeat classes.
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Treatment-Effect Dynamics
In order to consider the dynamic effect of being able to drink legally, we return
to our preferred outcome variable, students’ normalized grades, and our preferred
specification but replace the post-21 indicator variable with a set of indicator variables
corresponding to the number of terms following the term in which a student gains
legal access to alcohol. In particular, we include separate indicator variables for the
term in which the individual turns 21, one term after a student turns 21, . . . , five
terms after a student turns 21, and six-or-more terms after a student turns 21. The
omitted category, essential for identifying individual fixed effects and trends, is being
in a term prior to turning 21.18
Although it is possible to include indicator variables for terms prior to turning
21 to verify that grades do not fall below their expected levels in anticipation of
gaining legal access—which we do in a series of falsification tests—our preferred
estimates of the dynamic effects do not take this approach. We make this choice
out of consideration for the general tradeoff involved with including pre-treatment
indicator variables when using panel data approaches to estimation. Specifically, as
one includes more indicator variables for pre-treatment periods, the counterfactual for
the post-treatment periods becomes worse and worse as fewer observations contribute
to the estimate of the individual fixed effects. For example, if we were to include
indicators for one, two, three, and four terms prior to turning 21, our model would
be projecting a student’s future performance using observations from when he was
under the age of 20. As such, our estimates of interest corresponding to post-21 terms
18Note that although summer terms do not contribute to out analysis, such terms are considered
in defining the term-based proximity to the term in which a student turns 21. As such, when the
“turned 21 four terms ago” indicator variable is equal to one we are considering an individual in the
term he turns 22.
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would be noisier and less reliable than estimates that do not include these indicator
variables and instead use all pre-21 terms to form counterfactuals.
Our preferred estimates of the treatment effect dynamics, shown in Column 1 of
Table 5, indicate that grades fall significantly below their expected levels—by 0.036
standard deviations—in the term a student turns 21. This suggests an immediate
negative effect of legal access to alcohol on academic performance. Further, the
estimated coefficients corresponding to subsequent terms are usually significant and
of similar magnitude, which indicates that the effect persists. We do note, however,
that the coefficient on having turned 21 four terms ago (-0.055) is somewhat higher
than the rest, which may reflect a 22nd-birthday effect.19
In Figure 1, we present a graphical analogue to this analysis. In particular, we
plot average adjusted normalized GPAs by students’ ages in quarters. The normalized
GPAs have been adjusted by taking the residuals from a regression on individual
fixed effects, accumulated-credits fixed effects, and the course-specific fixed effects
described above. Like the estimates in Column 1 of Table 5, this figure shows clearly
that student GPAs fall below their expected levels when students turn 21 and, further,
they stay below their below their expected levels for several subsequent quarters.
In columns 2 through 5 of Table 5, we subject our estimation strategy to a series
of specification tests. In particular, we add to our model indicator variables for terms
preceding the term in which a student turns 21. Simply put, it would be a threat to
the validity of the research design if similar effect evident in terms before a student
turns 21. In order to maximize power, we take an incremental approach to adding
19We have also examined whether the timing of a student’s 21st birthday during the quarter is
related to its impact on grades. These results, discussed in detail in Lindo, Swensen, and Waddell
(2011), demonstrate that there are effects of gaining legal access to alcohol at any time during a
given quarter. Further, we cannot reject that the effect is the same for students gaining legal access
to alcohol at different times during the quarter.
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indicator variables for terms preceding an individual’s 21st birthday. In Column 2
we add an indicator for being one term prior to turning 21, in Column 3 we add an
indicator for being two terms prior to turning 21, in Column 4 we add an indicator
for being three terms prior to turning 21, and in Column 5 we add an indicator for
being four terms prior to 21. Ultimately, we have ten “placebo tests” across these
four columns where we do not anticipate any effects. Of these ten estimates, none
are significant, which provides support for our preferred identification strategy. We
also note that the estimates shown in Column 5 are what one would get if they were
estimating the effect of turning 20 on student performance. Unlike the RD-approach
above, where a 20th birthday effect is evident, we find no evidence that performance
declines when a student turns 20 using our preferred approach.
Treatment-Effect Heterogeneity
In Table 6 we explore the extent to which there are heterogeneous effects of legal
alcohol access on student achievement. Motivated by prior research documenting
gender differences in educational performance and in tendencies to engage in risky
behaviors, these tables report separate estimates for males and females. We also
consider heterogeneity by ability and financial-aid eligibility to determine whether
our main results are driven by individuals more likely to struggle with coursework or
those from particular economic backgrounds.
In Panel A we stratify the sample by student gender and ability, with “high
ability” students defined as those with SAT scores above the sample median of 1120
and “low ability” students defined as those at or below the sample median. The
results in columns 1 and 2 suggest that the effect of being able to drink legally is
larger for females on average than it is for males. The point estimates remain small,
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however, with legal access reducing female grades by 0.045 and male grades by 0.024
standard deviations. In columns 3 and 4, point estimates also suggest that the effect
on low-ability students may be slightly greater than the effect on high-ability students.
In columns 5 through 8, we separately consider the effects for low-ability males,
high-ability males, low-ability females, and high-ability females. These estimates
reveal substantial heterogeneity among males. Although there is a significant effect
on low-ability males whose grades fall 0.047 standard deviations below their expected
level after they gain legal access to alcohol, there appears to be no effect on high-ability
males. On the other hand, our point estimates suggest that there are negative effects
for both high- and low-ability females, although the estimated effects are greatest for
low-ability females.
In Panel B we stratify the estimates by financial-aid eligibility and gender for the
seventy percent of students who submitted a Free Application for Federal Student Aid
(FAFSA). In so doing, we define a student as “high-eligibility” if Pell Grant eligibility
is above the sample median and “low-eligibility” if Pell Grant eligibility is below the
sample median. In Column 1, we show that the estimated effect for this sample
of students (-0.042) is somewhat larger than the estimated effect based on the full
sample (-0.033). However, the set of estimates suggests that, among males, the effect
is concentrated among those who are likely to be from disadvantaged backgrounds. In
contrast, the estimated effect is similar across differing levels of financial-aid eligibility
among females.
Fixed-Effects Estimates using the NLSY97
The statistics shown in Section 3.2 support the notion that the University of
Oregon provides a fairly representative college setting. However, we lack data on
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drinking behavior at the University of Oregon. Thus, in this section we use data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) to analyze how college students’
drinking-related behaviors change upon gaining legal access to alcohol. While several
prior studies have analyzed the effects of legal alcohol access on drinking-related
behaviors (see Carpenter and Dobkin 2011 for a review), to our knowledge we are the
first to focus on the effects among college students.
Again utilizing the longitudinal nature of the data, we estimate the effect of legal
alcohol access (being at least 21 years old at the time of the interview) on drinking-
related behaviors during the past 30 days with an individual fixed effects model that
controls for a quadratic in age. As such, the estimated effect is identified based on
the discrete changes in behaviors that occur after an individual turns 21, adjusted for
the gradual changes that are expected as individuals grow older. All regressions use
NLSY97 sampling weights and cluster the standard-error estimates on the individual.
In Column 1 of Table 7 we summarize the results of our analysis for the full
sample. Across the panels A through D, we report the estimated effects on the
probability that an individual has drank alcohol during the past 30 days, the number
of days in which an individual has drank alcohol in the past 30 days, the number of
alcoholic drinks an individual has had on average when drinking during the past 30
days, and the number of days an individual has drank five or more drinks during the
past 30 days.20 These results demonstrate that legal access causes college students to
drink more often, as it increases the probability that an individual reports drinking
by 6.5 percentage points, the number days drinking by 1.4, and the number of days
drinking five or more drinks by 0.4. However, there is no evidence that legal access
causes college students to drink more intensely on occasions during which they drink.
20We impute 15 drinks per day for the 0.9 percent of individuals who report that they drink more
than 15 drinks per drinking occasion.
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This may reflect the likelihood that college students are more likely to be drinking
in public after they turn 21 where social pressures (and bartenders) may limit the
amount that an individual consumes.21
In columns 2 through 9 we consider heterogeneity across gender, ability, and
their interaction. High and low ability groups are defined based on the same SAT
cutoff used to define the two groups in our analysis of University of Oregon transcript
data. However, because SAT scores are missing for approximately two-thirds of the
sample where Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test scores are
not, we use ASVAB scores to impute predicted SAT scores where actual SAT scores
are not available.22
These estimates illustrate that the link between legal access and drinking
behaviors is complex. In particular, even putting imprecision aside, we usually cannot
say that the effects are greater for one group than another. For example, the point
estimates suggest that access has a bigger effect on the probability of drinking for
females but has a bigger effect on the number of days drinking for males. This mixed
pattern also appears when making comparisons across gender within ability groups.
Comparing the effects across ability groups, it appears as if the effect of legal access
is greater for high-ability females than low-ability females. We do not, however, see
the same pattern among males.
Given this mixed set of results, we are inclined to view these estimates as evidence
of “proof of concept.” Specifically, that we find effects of legal alcohol access on grades
21These results are consistent with Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) who report that legal access
leads to a 21 percent increase in drinking days (versus our estimate of is 33 percent), an insignificant
20-percent increase in heavy drinking days (versus our significant estimate of 19 percent), and find
little evidence of any effect on the number of drinks consumed when drinking.
22Specifically, predicted SAT scores are based on the conditional expectation function implied
by a regression of SAT scores on a quartic in ASVAB scores for the sample where both scores are
available.
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among students at the University of Oregon is only compelling if legal access affects
the behaviors of college students, which we demonstrate using the NLSY97. However,
we are not inclined to extend our interpretation of the results to estimate the effect
any particular measure of “drinking” on college performance given the variety of
ways in which one can measure drinking. As we alluded to in the introduction, legal
access may affect achievement through its impact on whether a student drinks, the
frequency with which a student drinks, and the intensity with which a student drinks,
in addition to the wide array of social activities that are associated with drinking.
Moreover, there are generally not any specific groups in the NLSY97 that we can
point to as being particularly responsive to legal access in their drinking activity,
except perhaps high-ability females.
That said, we do find it interesting that we find no significant effect on the
grades of high-ability males at the University of Oregon despite finding evidence in the
NLSY97 that they drink more often with legality. This may suggest that high-ability
students are particularly adept at changing their drinking-related behaviors without
compromising their grades but, of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that
high-ability males at the University of Oregon do not alter their drinking behaviors
upon gaining legal access. That said, the results for females also support the notion
that high-ability students are better able to maintain their grades when they change
their drinking activity. In particular, the NLSY97 data suggest that legal access has
a greater impact on the drinking behaviors of high-ability females than on low-ability
females; yet transcript data from the University of Oregon suggests that legal access
has a greater impact on the grades of low-ability females (though the difference is not
statistically significant).
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Conclusion
As a whole, our analysis suggests that legal access to alcohol does affect the
drinking behavior of college students and, in turn, affects student performance. At
the University of Oregon, legal access to alcohol reduces grades by 0.03 standard
deviations, or the equivalent of causing a student to perform as if his or her SAT
score were 20 points lower. As such, the effect we identify is smaller than Carrell,
Hoekstra, and West (2011) who find that gaining legal access at the end of the
academic term reduces grades by approximately 0.10 standard deviations. Given the
more conventional enforcement of MLDA at large public universities, this difference
might exist because legal access has a different effect on alcohol-related behavior across
the two settings. We also find substantial heterogeneity across gender and ability, in
ways that diverge meaningfully from the prior research. In particular, given that
the U.S. Air Force Academy is more selective and has a much larger fraction of men
than the University of Oregon, it is perhaps surprising that we find no evidence of
an effect among high-ability males. In addition, we identify a significant effect on the
performance of females.
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CHAPTER III
ARE BIG-TIME SPORTS A THREAT TO STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT?
This work was published in Volume 4, Issue 4 of the American Economics
Journal: Applied Economics in October 2012. Jason Lindo, Isaac Swensen, and Glen
Waddell were the principle investigators for this work.
Introduction
“Tailgaiting rituals, painted faces, and screaming fans are part of
American higher education as surely as physics labs and seminars on
Milton. . . Big-time athletics is too important to be relegated entirely to the
sports pages. . . At issue is whether the university entertainment enterprise
is a threat to American higher education or instead is one of its reasons
for success.”
– Charles T. Clotfelter, Big-Time Sports in American Universities
In the midst of record-setting revenues, escalating costs, and the launching
of conference-specific television networks, collegiate sports have never been bigger.
Moreover, they have grown to be quite important from a public-finance perspective.
In 2010, 211 out of 218 Division I athletics departments at universities subject to
open records laws received a subsidy from their student body or general fund.1 These
subsidies are substantial and rapidly growing. From 2006 to 2010, the average subsidy
increased 25 percent, to nine-million dollars. Given the large amount of tax-payer and
tuition dollars that are being channeled toward college sports programs, and concerns
1There are a total of 346 Division I schools, 128 of which are not subject to open records
laws. Division I is the highest level of intercollegiate athletics. Statistics are based on the
analysis of documents gathered by USA Today and Indiana University’s National Sports Journalism
Center. These data were available on 10 October 2011 at www.usatoday.com/sports/college/
2011-06-23-2011-athletic-department-subsidy-table_n.htm.
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that these programs might be detrimental to the academic missions of universities,
the merits of this spending has been the subject of intense debate.
However, almost nothing is known about its effect on human capital acquisition.2
The research that has been conducted on big-time college sports has focused primarily
on its advertising effects, considering impacts on student applications, student
enrollment, and alumni giving.3 To our knowledge, Clotfelter (2011) is the only prior
study to plausibly identify a causal effect of college sports on learning and research,
which are clearly the most important objectives of post-secondary institutions. It is
important to note that it is not clear ex ante what effect to anticipate, as some have
argued that college sports are a distraction that diverts time and attention away from
academic pursuits whereas others have argued that it could enhance productivity by
promoting social capital. To address the question empirically, Clotfelter examines
the number of JSTOR articles viewed (as a measure of work done by students and
faculty) at 78 research libraries around the time of the NCAA basketball tournament.
He finds that having a team in the tournament reduces the number of article views
and, further, that unexpected wins have especially large effects.
In this paper, we build on this earlier work by considering how academic
performance at a large public university varies with the prominence of university
football on campus, as measured by the team’s winning percentage in a given year.
One of the advantages of our approach that focuses on student GPAs is that it
provides a relatively long-run measure of student performance, whereas Clotfelter
2In describing the close-to-twenty years he convened the National Bureau of Economic Research
working group on higher education, Clotfelter (2011) reports: “In the 30 meetings of that group that
occurred over this period, scholars presented 176 papers on topics ranging from financial aid, rising
costs, and preferential admissions to faculty retirement, doctoral training, and sponsored research.
But only one paper during this entire period had to do with big-time college sports.”
3See the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics for further discussion. For recent work,
see Pope and Pope (2011).
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may be identifying the inter-temporal substitution of study time that might not affect
levels of learning. In addition, we can exploit the gender asymmetry in how closely
students follow college sports in order to speak to the extent to which the effects
might be driven by professor behavior rather than student behavior.
Our paper also contributes to the large literature on gender differences in higher
education, where some have argued that there is a pending “boy crisis.” This concern
is often motivated by the fact that males have fallen further and further behind females
in college attendance and completion over the past thirty years (Goldin, Katz, and
Kuziemko, 2006). The 2008 American Community Survey shows that 24 to 29 year
old females are 17-percent more likely to have attended college and 29-percent more
likely to have completed a baccalaureate degree than similarly-aged males.
Of additional concern is the fact that males tend to be less responsive than
females to educational interventions, which suggests that we may need to look
beyond traditional educational policies to better understand the determinants of
male performance.4 In this area, research focusing on the ability level of peers also
tends to find greater effects for females than males whereas studies that explore
alcohol consumption and its associated activities find mixed results.5 Collectively, this
4For example, males have been found to be less responsive, if responsive at all, to achievement
awards (Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Angrist, Lang, Oreopoulos, 2009), tuition reductions (Dynarski,
2008), and offers of academic advising (Angrist, Lang, Oreopoulos, 2009). Lindo, Sanders, and
Oreopoulos (2010) find that being placed on academic probation improves the grades of returning
females more than returning males, but that it causes males to drop out and has no such impact
on females. Babcock and Marks (2011) document that female students study more than their male
counterparts.
5In particular, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006), Han and Li (2009), and Carrell, Hoekstra,
and West (2011b) find greater peer effects among females; Foster (2006) finds larger effects for
males but concludes that there is “little evidence of robust residential peer effects on undergraduate
performance.” Kremer and Levy (2008) find that being assigned a heavily-drinking roommate affects
males more than females; Carrell, Hoekstra, and West (2011a) find that the effect of legal access
to alcohol is similar for males and females; and Lindo, Swensen, and Waddell (2011) find that legal
access affects females but not males.
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research suggests that one would be hard-pressed to reliably identify an important
factor that would have a greater influence on males’ academic performance than
females’ academic performance. While instructor gender might appear to be a likely
candidate, even the research in this area is mixed.6 As such, it is informative to
consider a prominent component of college culture that our priors suggest would
exhibit a pronounced influence on the male population—the hype and interest
associated with the success of the university football team.
The public university we consider, the University of Oregon, being largely
representative of other four-year public institutions and having substantial variation
in football success, provides an ideal setting to explore the effects of big-time college
sports. Highlighting the significance of the football team, Figure 2 summarizes survey
evidence on the number of football games students watched during the 2010 season.
Only 10 percent of females and an even smaller share of males report watching zero
games. Some 40 percent of females watched 10 or more games out of 12, while over
50 percent of males watched 10 or more games.
Our main results are based on student fixed effects models to ensure that the
estimates are not driven by systematic changes in the composition of students that
may be correlated with the success of the football team. This analysis reveals that
GPAs vary systematically with the prominence of university football on campus, as
measured by the team’s winning percentage in a given year.7 Our estimates suggest
6At the post-secondary level, Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009) find small effects overall but report
that these effects are “driven more by males performing worse when assigned to a female instructor,
with females performing about the same.” In contrast, Carrell, Page, and West (2010) report that
“professor gender has little impact on male students, [but] has a powerful effect on female students’
performance in math and science classes, their likelihood of taking future math and science courses,
and their likelihood of graduating with a STEM degree.” See Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009) for
an in-depth review of the larger literature that focuses on the primary and secondary levels.
7Other documented behaviors associated with collegiate football include increased crime (Rees
and Schnepel, 2009) and heavy alcohol consumption (Neal and Fromme, 2007; Glassman, Werch,
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that three fewer wins in a season would be expected to reduce the gender gap by
nine percent. In order to speak to the mechanisms at work, we provide evidence
that students’ time use and study behaviors respond differentially by gender to the
football team’s performance.8 Given that females’ time use and study behaviors are
also affected by the team’s performance, it is likely that their performance is affected
as well but this is masked by the usual practice of grade curving. We also explore
heterogeneity across race and measures of socioeconomic status—we find that the
effects are most severe for non-whites and those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
In order to consider an outcome that is more-clearly linked to long-run outcomes,
we supplement our analysis of GPAs with an analysis of drop-out behavior. With the
caveat that we cannot control for student fixed effects in this analysis, we find that
the success of the football team does not significantly affect the probability that male
students drop out before their next fall quarter. Given that their grades are impaired,
this suggests that male drop-out behavior is not sensitive to academic performance
or that any effect of academic performance on drop-out behavior is counterbalanced
by other effects of the football team’s success. In contrast, we find that the success of
the football team decreases the probability that low-ability females drop out, which
may be due to improved grades or to other effects of the team’s success.
Data Used in Main Analysis
Our primary source of data is University of Oregon student transcripts, covering
all undergraduate classes administered from fall quarter of 1999 through winter
and Bian, 2007; Glassman, et. al., 2010). Card and Dahl (2011) also find increases in male on female
violence associated with NFL football games.
8See Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2004) for a discussion on the relationship between time use
and educational outcomes.
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quarter of 2007. For our main analysis, we limit the sample to fall quarters to
coincide with the collegiate-football seasons. We also limit the sample to non-athlete
undergraduate students as we anticipate that athletic success, if not endogeneous to
athletes’ academic performance, may interact differently with student-athlete grades.
After making these restrictions, our main sample consists of 29,737 students, or
267,322 student-class observations across nine fall quarters.9
We combine these data with readily available reports of the football team’s win-
loss records which we use to form our term-specific measures of athletic success—the
ratio of total games won to total games played.10 Over our sample period, the winning
percentage is 69.7 percent, on average, and varies from 45.5 percent to 90.9 percent.
This large public university is also representative in terms of institutional and
student characteristics. While twice the size and having higher admission rates than
the average public-four-year institution, it is similar in terms of enrollment rates and
SAT scores of incoming students. It is also similar to the average college in costs
of attendance and in financial aid opportunities. Like most other institutions, the
University of Oregon is over half female and predominately white, although at 75
percent it has a larger share of white students than is typical of the universe of U.S.
post-secondary institutions.11 We report summary characteristics of our data in Table
8. Consistent with the discussion in the introduction, males have systematically lower
9The implied average number of classes per student is low as we do not observe all students’
complete tenure at the institution. Normal patterns of attrition from the university also act to lower
this ratio.
10For five of the nine seasons spanned by our data, the team played 11 regular season games; for the
other four seasons, the team played 12 regular season games. Post-season games, which take place
after the fall quarter ends, are not used to construct the winning percentage used for our analysis.
Although pre- or post-season rankings could conceivably be used to proxy for the prominence of
university football on campus in a similar fashion, the University of Oregon was unranked in most
of the years spanned by our data.
11See Lindo, Swensen, Waddell (2011) for additional comparisons to other four-year public U.S.
institutions.
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GPAs than females. On average, they earn GPAs of 2.94 whereas the average among
females is 3.12. This gap is present for first-year students and students who have
been at the university for several years. In unreported analysis, we have verified that
the gap cannot be explained by ability upon entry, as measured by high-school GPAs
and SAT scores.
Estimated Effects on GPAs
Main Results
In Panel A of Table 9, we report estimates of the effect of athletic success on
male GPAs. To begin, in Column (1) we estimate
Gijt = α + θWinningPercentaget + ijt, (3.1)
where Gijt is the grade of student i in class j in the fall term of year t and
WinningPercentaget is the ratio of wins to total games played in year t; standard
errors estimates are clustered on the student. This simple model leads to an estimate
of θ of -0.142.
Of course, the extent to which the university experienced grade inflation in
the years spanned by the data and the football team’s performance got somewhat
worse, this estimate may overstate the negative impact of the football team’s success.
Indeed, in Column (2) where we control for a quadratic in time, the point estimate
is substantially smaller (-0.064) although it remains statistically significant. This
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estimate is largely unchanged by the inclusion of a rich set of controls for observable
student characteristics in Column (3).12
Our preferred estimates are identified off of within-student longitudinal variation
in grades as the football team’s winning percentage varies, corresponding to the
regression equation
Gijt = αi + ψWinningPercentaget + βXijt + eijt, (3.2)
where αi are student fixed effects. As this approach isolates the effect of athletic
success on individual-student performance in fall classes across terms, we are
implicitly assuming that the counterfactual for a student’s performance in “high-
win terms” is the student’s own performance in “low-win terms” and vice versa. We
prefer this approach because it controls flexibly for the changing composition of the
student body from year to year which may not be well captured by the battery of
observable characteristics available in our data (or by a smooth time trend). Column
(4) shows the estimated effect based on this model, still controlling for the overall time
trend in order to address grade inflation; it is smaller (-0.039) but remains statistically
significant.
In Column (5), we address the fact courses offered during fall quarters may differ
from year to year which could lead to a spurious relationship between the performance
of the football team and student grades. We do so by controlling for subject-by-level
12In particular, in this column, we add controls for math and verbal SAT scores, high-school GPA,
age at entry, and indicator variables for Black, Hispanic, and Asian, and for having graduated from
a private high-school.
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fixed effects.13 With the addition of these controls, the estimated effect is unchanged
but is more precisely estimated.
In Column (6), we take an alternative approach to controlling for time-varying
factors, including fixed effects for the number of credits a student has accumulated
before the quarter begins instead of the overall time trend.14 This approach is
motivated by our desire to control flexibly for the tendency for grades to increase
as students make progress toward their degrees. Of course, it would be desirable
to control for this tendency in addition to the long-run trend but, with student
fixed effects in the model, this would lead to near-perfect multicolinearity. With
this tradeoff acknowledged, we note that the estimated effect based on this model
(-0.069) is larger than the estimate based on the model that instead controls for a
smooth time trend.
It is important to note that the practice of grading student performance on a
curve implies that the estimates in Panel A are likely to understate the true effect
on male performance. For example, if the success of the football team impairs all
students’ performance equally, there would be no effect on any student’s GPA under
strict curving. In contrast, if the success of the football team has an especially
large impact on the performance of a particular group of students (males), we would
clearly expect to see their GPAs fall relative to others (females). Further, one would
anticipate that the one group’s “response” to athletic success would appear to offset
the other’s, consistent with the zero-sum nature of strict grading curves.
With this in mind, in Panel B we perform the same analysis for the female-
student population. The estimates based on our model with student fixed effects are
13For example, subjects correspond to economics, english, and mathematics, while levels
correspond to either 100-, 200-, 300-, or 400-level classes.
14The fixed effects are a series of indicator variables for credits in intervals of four.
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positive though they vary in their statistical significance. However, for the reasons
described above, even if the estimates were strongly significant, it would not imply
that athletic success improves female performance—in Section 3.5 we present evidence
suggesting that female performance is likely impaired—but instead would likely reflect
that the relatively-large impact on males improves females’ relative performance which
translates into higher grades when grades are based on a curve. The fact that the
magnitude of the estimated effects on females tends to be smaller than the magnitude
of the estimated effect on males suggests that grade curves are not perfectly strict.
Additionally, it is important to note that the estimated effects on females’ GPAs
suggest that it is unlikely that the effects on males are driven by professor behavior. If
athletic success led professors to be more generous or more harsh in assigning grades,
we would anticipate observing similar effects on both male and female students.15
As a measure of relative performance, the gender gap in grades is not subject
to the interpretative challenges discussed above. Inasmuch as grading curves are
uniformly applied to male and female students, changes in the gender-gap in GPAs
that are systematic with football performance are clearly indicative of changes in
gender-specific performance. Pooling male and female observations and adding the
interaction of winning percentage and an indicator for being male to the models
described above, in Panel C we estimate the effect of athletic success on the gender
gap in grades. The coefficient on the interaction of the winning percentage with
the indicator for being male provides the estimated effect of athletic success on the
gender gap in grades. Whereas the gender-specific estimates were somewhat sensitive
15Although we think it is unlikely, we do note that it is possible that the success of the football
team causes professors to grade male and female students differently. That said, we have verified
that our main result is also evident if we focus on large classes (with at least 50 students) where this
sort of professor behavior is less likely. In fact, the estimated effect is even larger when the sample
is restricted in this manner.
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to the inclusion of differing control variables, the estimated impact on the gender
gap is quite stable as the coefficient estimates range from -0.052 to -0.072 across the
five columns.16 Further, they are statistically significant and virtually identical in
columns (4) and (5), which display our preferred estimates. To put the magnitude of
the estimate (-0.061) into context, it suggests that a 25-percentage-point increase in
the football team’s winning percentage will increase the gender gap in GPAs (0.18)
by 8.5 percent.
Estimated Effects Using Aggregate Data
While we prefer the the approach described above because it allows us to control
for several potential confounders, the pattern we have identified is sufficiently regular
that it is evident in a plot of the mean difference between male and female grades
and winning percentage across years. We provide such a plot in Figure 3, for 1999
through 2007. The correlation coefficient between the difference in average grades
(i.e., male minus female) and winning percentage is -0.736. Moreover, aggregating
grades to the nine fall-term observations at which the variation in winning percentage
exists and regressing the difference between male and female GPAs on the winning
percentage yields an estimated coefficient of -0.074 and a heteroskedasticity-robust
standard-error estimate of 0.027—very close to the point estimates in our preferred
specification in Table 9
16We have also estimated models that include course-credits fixed effects, course-enrollment fixed
effects (in bins of 10 from 0–50, bins of 25 from 50–100, and bins of 50 from 100–250), and fixed
effects for the number of credits the a student is taking in the current quarter. The inclusion of
these controls changes the estimated effect by less than 0.001. In addition, we have considered using
GPAs normalized at the class level as an outcome variable. These results are also very similar, albeit
somewhat larger in magnitude, to our main results.
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Estimated Effects Across Letter-Grade Assignments
In Table 10, we explore the potential for winning percentage to influence grades
non-linearly across the grade distribution. Specifically, we replace “grade point”
with binary letter-grade assignments on the left-hand side. Because it offers a clearer
interpretation, in this subsection and the subsections that follow, we focus on the effect
of athletic success on the gender gap in GPAs. We also focus on our preferred models
that control for student fixed effects and subject-by-level fixed effects. However,
because there is a tradeoff involved with controlling for time versus controlling for
accumulated credits, in separate panels we present estimates that take each of these
two approaches.
In Table 10, we replace “grade point” with binary letter-grade assignments on
the left-hand side. As such, in Column (1), the coefficient on the interaction of the
indicator for being male and the winning percentage is interpreted as the difference
between males and females in the impact of athletic success on the probability of
receiving a grade of “A” in a given class. Across columns (1) through (4), we observe
meaningful decreases in the probabilities of receiving As and Bs and increases in the
probabilities of receiving Cs or lower for males in response to the success of the team.
Clearly, the largest effect on the gender gap appears to occur at the lowest end of the
grade distribution—in the probability of receiving a failing grade.
This Pattern is Unique to Fall Terms
In Table 11, we investigate whether similar effects are found in winter and
spring quarters, where one would not expect the winning percentage to affect student
performance. Doing so provides evidence that only in the quarter we associate
with football—the fall quarter—is there movement in the gender gap in academic
37
performance that varies systematically with athletic success.17 Among the eight
coefficient estimates for the winter and spring quarters, corresponding to the overall
effect of the winning percentage and the differential effect on males, none are
statistically significant.
Heterogeneity
In tables 12 and 13, we explore the extent to which there are heterogeneous
effects of athletic success on the gender gap. While such heterogeneity is interesting
for a variety of reasons, a primary motivation for exploring heterogeneous impacts is
to support the external validity of our estimates. For instance, if we see the same
phenomenon across different groups at one institution, it lends credibility to the idea
that similar effects might be present at institutions with different compositions of
students. We first consider heterogeneity across ability and financial-aid eligibility to
determine whether our main results are driven by individuals more likely to struggle
with coursework or those from particular economic backgrounds. We then examine
the possibility for heterogeneous effects across race.
Table 12 stratifies the estimates by various measures of ability and relative socio-
economic status. In columns (1) through (4) the estimates are stratified by ability,
where “low-ability” students are defined as those with cumulative SAT scores in the
lowest tercile, and medium- and high-ability students are defined similarly.18 These
results provide strong evidence that the effect of athletic success on the gender gap is
most prominent among lower-ability students. In particular, Column (2) suggests
that, among low-ability students, the gender gap in grades increases by 0.03 in
17Over our sample time period, all bowl games that the football team participated in took place
between the end of the fall quarter and the beginning of the winter quarter.
18Results are similar using high-school GPAs to construct the measure of ability.
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response to a 25-percentage-point increase in the winning percentage, accounting
for 14 percent of the existing gender gap (0.22) among those students. The estimated
effect on the gender gap has the same sign for medium- and high-ability students but
is smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant.
Columns (5) through (8) consider the effects stratified by “financial need” for
the 70 percent of students who submitted a Free Application for Federal Student Aid
(FAFSA).19 These estimates suggest that the impact on the gender gap is largest
among students from more-disadvantaged backgrounds. Again, the estimated effect
on the gender gap is negative for all groups but is only significant for those in the
highest tercile of financial need.
In Table 13 we provide estimates stratified by race. After again displaying the
estimate based on the full sample, columns (2) and (3), show separate estimates for
whites and non-whites. These estimates demonstrate that the winning percentage
affects the gender gap among both whites and non-whites, but that the effect is
particularly strong in the minority-student population. In columns (4) through (5),
we further stratify non-white into Black, Hispanic, and Asian. Although estimates
are imprecise at this level, there is suggestive evidence that the largest effects are
found in the black-student population.
19To determine the level of the Pell grant, FAFSA-reported data are used to calculate two key
measures: a cost of attendance (COA) (which varies across both institutions and students) and an
expected family contribution (EFC) (which varies across students). The COA is a measure of the
expected educational expenses a student will undertake. Individual institutions set the COA for a
given student, based on the attributes of the institution and the student. For full-time students, their
COA includes such costs as tuition and fees, books, supplies, transportation, other personal education
related expenses, and room and board. For part-time students and those enrolled in correspondence
courses COA expenses are more limited. Once the COA and EFC have been calculated, the value of
the Pell award is formulaic. The level of an individual student’s grant in a given year is the minimum
of: (a) the difference between the Federal maximum Pell Grant and the student’s EFC; and (b) the
difference between the institution’s COA and the student’s EFC.
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More broadly, we note that the estimated effects on the gender gap are negative
in all regressions presented in tables 12 and 13. This suggests that the overall impact
is not being driven by any one group in particular, even though there is heterogeneity
in the effect on the gender gap among different groups.
Estimated Effects on Drop-Out Behavior
In this section, we consider the effect on an outcome that is more-closely tied
to students’ long-run success—the probability of dropping out of school. Although it
might seem more desirable to focus on the impact on graduation, we do not adopt
this approach for two reasons. First, our panel is not long enough to be able to
reliably measure graduation for many of the cohorts we observe. Second, while there
is substantial variation in the team’s winning percentage from year to year, there is
much less variation from cohort to cohort (after averaging the team’s success during
their tenure) and the variation that does exist across cohorts is not as likely to be
exogenous. As such, we instead focus on the probability of dropping out of the
University before the next academic year, defined as an indicator variable equal to
one if a student is not observed in the next fall term or any subsequent term and has
not graduated. We do so with the caveat that this analysis may reflect impacts on the
timing of drop-out behavior in addition to impacts on the probability of graduation.
An additional caveat to this exercise is that, lacking within-student variation
from year to year, we cannot include student fixed effects in our regression models.
Instead, we control for student characteristics with a rich set of covariates: math
and verbal SAT score, high-school GPA, age at entry, race, and whether the student
graduated from a private high-school. In addition, we control for the year and a
student’s accumulated credits in the current fall term, as in our previous analyses.
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Before describing the results of this analysis, it is important to note that we often
do not have clear predictions for the sign of the effect. On one hand, the success of the
football team may directly reduce the probability that a student drops out because
it leads to a more enjoyable college experience. On the other hand, the success of the
football team may affect the probability that a student drops out through its impact
on his or her GPA (and number of failed classes).
Column (1) of Table 14 shows the estimated effect based on the full sample.20
The estimated coefficient on the winning percentage and its interaction with gender
are both small and insignificant, suggesting that the success of the team does not
affect drop-out decisions in the aggregate. However, columns (2) through (4) of
Table 14 show that this masks substantial heterogeneity across ability. In particular,
Column (2) reveals that, among those with low-SAT scores, a successful team reduces
the probability that females drop out while having no significant effect on males. In
light of the estimated effects on GPAs shown in Table 12, this impact on females
may be driven by the positive impact on their GPAs but could also be a direct effect
of the team’s success; the lack of a significant impact on males suggests that the
negative impact on their GPAs is offset by the direct effect of the team’s success. The
remaining columns of Table 14 explore heterogeneity across financial need, providing
suggestive evidence that the team’s success reduces the probability that high-need
females drop out.
Table 15 considers heterogeneity across race. Generally, these estimates are too
imprecise to draw any strong conclusions. However, they do suggest that the success
of the football team reduces the probability that black females drop out and perhaps
increases the probability that black males drop out. These results are consistent with
20Estimates are very similar if seniors are not included in the analysis.
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the point estimates in Table 13, which suggested positive effects on black females’
GPAs and negative effects on black males’ GPAs.
Survey Evidence on Mechanisms
To shed light on the underlying mechanisms driving our main results, we surveyed
undergraduate classes during three regularly-scheduled class times in the 2011 spring
term.21 Of the classes surveyed, 183 students were enrolled in an introductory
economics course and 80 were enrolled in either of two upper-division economics
courses. The students enrolled in introductory economics are largely representative
of the freshman and sophomore student body, as introductory economics is a general-
education requirement for many majors and the majority (90 percent) of students are
in their first or second year of school. The students we surveyed in the upper-division
economics courses were primarily (90 percent) juniors and seniors.
Survey Design
As part of the survey, we collected information on general student characteristics,
interest in the university football team, and about known or anticipated behavioral
changes around the outcomes of university football games. We focused on alcohol
consumption, partying, studying, and class attendance, with questions worded to
elicit differences in these behaviors when the football team wins relative to when the
football team loses. In our reported survey results, we limit the sample to non-first-
year students—53 percent of our sample. While the patterns we report are insensitive
21Our survey design is informed by Clotfelter (2011), who reports that students at highly selective
big-time sports universities spend more time exercising and participating in team sports, are more
likely to report binge drinking, and possibly spend less time studying and doing research.
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to this restriction, this ensures that the survey respondents had experienced a regular-
season loss.22
Survey Results
To broadly measure academic time use related to football success, we collected
student responses to the question, “Does the success of the University of Oregon
football team decrease the amount of time you study for classes?” Figure 4 summarizes
student responses, where categorical responses range from “Definitely Not” to
“Definitely.” While both distributions are skewed right, the male distribution shows
significantly higher mass to the right, which is consistent with relatively more males
reporting a decrease in study time around a football “success.” In fact, 24 percent of
males report that athletic success either “Definitely” or “Probably” decreases their
study time, compared to only 9 percent of females.
Figure 5 presents student responses to questions regarding changes in alcohol
consumption, partying, studying, and class attendance—comparing behaviors when
the team wins to when the team loses. In Panel A, we see that roughly 28 percent of
males report a tendency to increase alcohol consumption when the football team wins
rather than loses, while only 20 percent of females report the same.23 Although this
22Figures for the first-year sample are available on request. In our preferred models, the influence of
winning percentage on fall-term grades is independent of post-season bowl activity (i.e., subsequent
to fall term grades being posted). However, while first-year students had not experienced a regular-
season loss at the time of our survey, they had experienced a loss in the Bowl Championship Series
game in January, 2011. However, one might worry that such a loss may overly influence first-year
students’ perceptions of how they respond to wins versus losses. Anticipating this, we also asked
students to compare “big games” to other games, where big games are described as “a game against
a rivalry team, a ranked team, a game that involves significant hype, etc.” While we do not highlight
these responses, similar patterns also appear in these survey responses.
23Conditional on reporting that one consumes alcohol, which we collected in the survey, the
estimated difference increases to 12 percentage points (p=0.155).
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difference is not statistically significant, the results indicate a large effect on males
and females and remains suggestive of a more pronounced effect for males.
Panel B presents similar results for partying. Despite being unable to determine
all activities encompassed by students’ definitions of partying, this question allows us
to broadly account for additional behavioral responses beyond alcohol consumption
that are associated with increased excitement following a win. We observe that 28-
percent of females report increased partying when the team wins versus 47 percent
of males.24
In terms of educational activities, Panel C shows that the difference between
males and females reporting that they study less when the team wins is approximately
14 percent. Panel D indicates that female students are slightly more likely to indicate
an increased tendency to miss class associated with a win; however the result is small
in magnitude and not significant.
In summary, our survey results lend strong support for a differential impact of
athletic success on male and female behaviors. Both in absolute terms and relative
to females, athletic success decreases males’ academic time investments and increases
time spent in distracting or risky behaviors. That said, we also find an impact on
female behaviors, including studying, alcohol consumption, and partying. While our
previous empirical analysis of grades can primarily speak to relative performance,
our survey results suggest that the aggregate impact of athletic success on academic
performance, or learning, likely extends to females.
24This difference is statistically significant at the five-percent level.
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Discussion and Conclusion
We identify the effect of football success with student-class-level data spanning
nine football seasons, 1999 through 2007. Our preferred specifications include
individual-student fixed effects to identify the effect off of longitudinal variation.
That is, our preferred estimates are based on considering how a student’s performance
deviates from his or her own average performance as the winning percentage varies
from its average, and then how this response varies across gender. With our analysis
we show that male grades fall significantly with the success of the football team, both
in absolute terms and relative to females. There is also pronounced heterogeneity
among students, suggesting that the impact is largest among students from relatively-
disadvantaged backgrounds and those of relatively low ability.
We also find evidence that the success of the football team reduces the probability
that some students drop out. In particular, the groups of females whose GPAs increase
with the success of the football team (i.e., those with low ability, those with high
financial need, and blacks) are less likely to drop out of school after a successful
season. At the same time, we cannot determine whether this result is driven by
their improved academic performance or by more-direct effects of the team’s success.
That said, we find no evidence that the success of the football team has any impact on
males’ drop-out behavior, which may be due to offsetting effects of impaired academic
performance and greater enjoyment of the academic year.
In addition to our main analysis, we offer insight into the underlying mechanisms
that may be driving the systematic patterns evident in measured academic
performance. In particular, we elicit student responses to questions about behaviors
around football outcomes. Beyond confirming that there is a high level of student
viewership and interest in football, survey responses reveal pronounced gender
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differences in behavioral responses to athletic success. Relative to females, males
report being more likely to increase alcohol consumption, decrease studying, and
increase partying around the success of the football team. Yet, both male and female
students report that their behavior is responsive to athletic success. This suggests
that female performance is likely affected by the performance of the football team as
well but that this effect is masked by grade curving.
We view our research as taking one of the first steps toward documenting the non-
monetary costs associated with college athletics. Of course, whether it is desirable to
be investing large amounts of public and student money in college sports requires a
broad consideration of all costs, in addition to the benefits that might be generated.
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CHAPTER IV
SUBSTANCE-ABUSE TREATMENT AND MORTALITY
Introduction
The number of drug-induced deaths in the United States have more than doubled
over the last decade—now totaling approximately 40,000 deaths annually and recently
outnumbering traffic fatalities as the leading cause of injury-related deaths (Kochanek
et al., 2011). Moreover, these increases have occurred over a time period when many
other injury-related deaths were declining and when resources devoted to drug-control
policies were increasing.1 Naturally, this has given rise to intense debate regarding
the merits of intervention policies designed to limit drug abuse and its consequences.
The primary objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of one such intervention
policy—substance-abuse treatment—and its impact on drug-induced deaths.
Policies intending to reduce costs associated with drug abuse typically
concentrate on either supply-side enforcement, such as regulations disrupting the
distribution of an illicit drug, or a demand-side approach such as treatment or
prevention. In the United States, federal spending primarily targets drug-supply-
reducing policies, including law enforcement, interdiction, and international relations
(ONDCP, 2005). In general, enforcement policies do not appear to be very
effective.2 Moreover, where researchers find reductions in drug-related outcomes due
1For information on other preventable deaths see CDC WONDER online database, 2002-2009.
See ONDCP (2005) for information on national drug control spending.
2Research considering supply side interventions includes drug-crime deterrence (Dinardo, 1993;
Miron, 1999; Kuziemko and Levitt, 2004), disruptions in the supply of drug precursors (Dobkin
and Nicosia, 2009; Dobkin, Nicosia and Wienburg, 2013; Cunningham and Liu, 2003, 2005) and,
more broadly, the price-elasticities of illicit drugs (Chaloupka and Saffer, 1999; Caulkins and Reuter,
1998).
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to enforcement efforts, they are typically temporary and, arguably, costly relative to
alternatives. For example, Dobkin and Nicosia (2009) examine what they consider
to be “quite possibly the DEA’s greatest success in disrupting the supply of a
major illicit substance,” analyzing the effect of a major disruption in the supply
of methamphetamine precursors in 1995. They find a temporary effect on drug
prices, health outcomes and drug-related arrests—with drug prices returning to pre-
intervention levels in four months and other outcomes recovering within 18 months.3
Also examining enforcement policies, Kuziemko and Levitt (2004) find that the overall
effect of dramatic increases in drug-offender incarceration rates from 1985-1996 led to
a small reduction in related crime, and conclude that such law enforcement policies
are likely not cost-effective. Finally, Dinardo (1993) finds no evidence that regional
and time variation in drug seizures influence cocaine use or the price of cocaine.4
Substance-abuse treatment is one promising alternative approach to drug control,
potentially reducing the demand for addictive substances and mitigating related
externalities.5 Moreover, it is a particularly relevant policy in light of changes brought
about by the Affordable Care Act, which will require all health insurance sold on the
exchanges to include services for substance-use disorders and will increase funding
for these services (Buck, 2011). That said, researchers have yet to demonstrate a
causal effect of substance-abuse treatment in reducing drug-related outcomes among
the general population. This is primarily due to the nature of illicit-drug markets
3More recently, Dobkin, Nicosia and Wienburg (2013) find no changes in methamphetamine
consumption or drug-related arrests associated with state laws targeting over-the-counter medicine
used to produce methamphetamine.
4In related work Saffer, Chaloupka, and Dave (2001) analyze state spending on both supply
and demand-side drug-control policies and argue that drug treatment spending may be a relatively
efficient method to reduce drug abuse.
5Prevention is another primary demand-side intervention. In recent work, Anderson (2010) finds
no effect of an aggressive anti-methamphetamine advertising campaign on youth methamphetamine
use.
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and the poor quality and availability of drug-use and treatment data. As such,
analyses of substance-abuse treatment often rely on small samples of self-reported
substance use and adverse consequences pre- and post-treatment. In such cases,
attributing post-treatment changes in drug-related outcomes to treatment gives rise to
serious concerns regarding bias induced by selection and the propensity for individuals
entering treatment to regress to the mean.6 Moreover, in studies where randomization
is possible the findings are often difficult to generalize to broad populations due to
small sample sizes or a narrow focus on specific treatment approaches and/or select
demographic groups.
These limitations aside, a large literature provides evidence that treatment
reduces drug-abuse and related problems. For instance, meta-analyses of resarch
based on clinical trials consistently find significant declines in drug-use and related
outcomes associated with all major modalities of treatment (Prendergast et al., 2002;
Brewer et al., 1998; Griffith et al., 2000). Economic-evaluation studies further suggest
that the benefits of treatment far outweigh the costs and that treatment is less
costly than alternative drug-control policies such as incarceration or policing.7 For
example, Rydell and Everingham (1994) compare treatment and enforcement methods
to reduce cocaine abuse using three evaluation criteria: consumption costs, number
of users, and total societal costs. In each case they find a significant advantage for
treatment, arguing that 34 million dollars in treatment has roughly the same impact
as 246 million dollars devoted to enforcement strategies.
6A notable exception is Lu and Mcguire (2002), who consider the marginal productivity of
outpatient treatment using an instrumental variables approach. They find a decrease in drug use
associated with increased time in treatment.
7For reviews of related literature see Cartwright (2000), McCollister and French (2003).
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Despite this evidence, questions remain regarding the efficacy of treatment in
reducing drug abuse and its consequences. A common concern is that addictive
behaviors may be unresponsive to treatment interventions as evidenced by low
treatment completion rates (44%) and a high likelihood of relapse.8 As such,
opponents argue that treatment may not yield better results than currently-employed
drug-control policies. In the case that treatment is beneficial, it is unclear whether
treatment reaches those in need due to social stigma toward seeking treatment and
institutional constraints. For instance, drug-court referrals, which offer drug offenders
priority access to treatment as an alternative to incarceration, potentially crowd-out
voluntary clients who are, arguably, more likely to benefit from treatment.9 For
example, Hser et al (2007) find that increases in court-referred treatment admissions
in California displace clients seeking treatment on their own.
Finally, additional opposition to a treatment approach comes from community
groups who argue that local services for drug users may actually be detrimental—
citing perceived concerns for personal security and general neighborhood quality
(Tempalski, 2007). Taken together, these issues question the efficacy a treatment-
based approach to drug control and highlight the need to understand the underlying
relationship between investments in treatment and drug-related consequences.
To my knowledge, this paper offers the first estimate of the causal effect
of substance-abuse treatment on mortality. In particular, I provide a reduced-
form analysis of substance-abuse treatment by estimating the effect of treatment
facility openings and closings on county-level drug-induced mortality rates. My
8See SAMHSA (2008a) for treatment completion rates.
9Drug courts were first introduced in 1989 and have since spread to all 50 states, totaling 2,147
operating courts in 2008 (Stinchcomb, 2010). In 2007, 37 percent of reported admissions in the
Treatment Episodes Data Set were referred to treatment from the criminal justice system (SAMHSA,
2008).
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identification strategy leverages within-county variation in the number of substance-
abuse treatment facilities over a period of 11 years (1998-2008), spanning 48 states.
To account for the possibility that openings and closings systematically vary with
other determinants of drug-induced deaths, I estimate models including state-by-
year fixed effects in addition to a rich set of county-by-year controls. Finally, I offer
evidence of an underlying mechanism associated with treatment by analyzing the
effect of variation in the number of treatment facilities on substance-abuse treatment
admissions.
The analysis reveals that treatment facilities significantly reduce mortality. The
reduction in mortality is most prominent among drug-induced deaths, though I do
find evidence of positive spillovers of treatment as facilities also reduce other drug-
abuse-related causes including homicides, suicides and, to some extent, disease-related
deaths. The preferred estimates indicate that an additional facility reduces a county’s
annual drug-induced mortality rate by 0.4 percent, suggesting that a 10 percent
increase in the number of facilities lowers a county’s drug-induced mortality rate by
2 percent. That the estimates are persistent across demographic and socio-economic
groups suggests that the benefits of treatment are quite broad.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I discuss several
key features of treatment and background on drug-overdose deaths. I describe the
data and introduce the empirical methodology in sections 3 and 4. In Section 5,
I present the main analysis on drug-induced mortality and the analysis of effects
on other causes of death in Section 6. In Section 7, I show estimates using an
alternative data source and an analysis of the effect of treatment facilities on treatment
admissions. Finally, I conclude and discuss the implications of the results in Section
7.
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Background
According to the National Survey of Drug Use and Health, nine percent (23.1
million) of Americans age 12 or older are current illicit or non-medical drug users.
One estimate of the economic costs of drug use—measured in terms of crime, health
and productivity—totaled more than $193 billion in 2007 (NDIC, 2011). Though
substance-abuse treatment is a promising avenue that may reduce these costs,
treatment rates for those in need remain very low. In 2010, 90 percent of those
classified as substance dependent or substance abusing did not receive treatment.
Several commonly cited barriers to treatment take-up are cost constraints and a lack
of insurance coverage.10
Evidence suggests, however, that reducing cost barriers alone is not sufficient
to dramatically increase treatment admissions due to existing capacity constraints.
For example, Dave and Mukerjee (2011) analyze the effect of state legislation that
reduces out-of pocket costs for mental health and substance-abuse treatment and
find a relatively small effect on treatment admissions. They argue that the effect
on admissions is muted, in part, because of treatment capacity constraints.11 As
such, expansions in the number of treatment facilities likely relax capacity constraints
leading to increased take-up of treatment.
10From 2007-2010, 38.1 percent of individuals making an effort to get treatment, but not receiving
it report health coverage and cost as a primary reason. Other reported reasons for not receiving
treatment include “not ready to stop using (30.3 percent), able to handle the problem without
treatment (9.0 percent), no transportation/inconvenient (8.4 percent), might have negative effect
on job (7.9 percent), had health coverage but did not cover treatment or did not cover cost (7.4
percent), might cause neighbors/community to have negative opinion (7.1 percent), and did not feel
need for treatment at the time (6.5 percent)” (SAMHSA, 2011).
11The authors highlight supply and capacity constraints suggested by limited growth in the number
of treatment facilities and increasing treatment waiting periods, which stand in stark contrast to the
35% increase in substance-related emergency department visits and a growing gap between those
needing and those receiving treatment.
52
In this environment of existing capacity constraints and a growing need for
treatment, the number of substance-abuse treatment facilities—the source of the
variation used in this paper—may be a particularly relevant policy parameter. In
the United States, over 13,500 stand-alone treatment centers are the primary setting
for delivery of substance-abuse treatment, offering a wide range of drug-treatment
programs and related services.12 On average, these facilities are quite small—
treating 276 individuals annually—and are heavily dependent on outside sources
of funding.13 The typical treatment episode includes detoxification and medically-
and/or behaviorally-based treatment, followed by efforts to prevent or limit relapse
after completion of treatment.14
Admissions rates into these specialized treatment facilities are higher for
individuals who are white, male, unemployed, and less educated (SAMHSA, 2008).15
According to the Treatment Episodes Data Set (TEDS), 96 percent of admissions
relate to five main substances: alcohol (22 percent), alcohol with secondary drug
abuse (18 percent), opiates (19 percent), marijuana/hashish (16 percent), cocaine (13
percent) and other stimulants (8 percent).16
Though an analysis of specific treatment programs is beyond the scope of this
study, understanding several features of substance-abuse treatment provides insight
12According to National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS) data from
2002-2008, 87 percent of facilities offering treatment are not located in or operated by a hospital.
13These facilities are primarily privately owned (87 percent). 95 percent are licensed, certified, or
accredited—typically by state health agencies/departments—to provide substance abuse treatment.
(SAMHSA, 2008).
14In many cases, treatment facilities include ancillary services such as substance-abuse education,
outreach activities, counseling, self-help groups, mental health services, and others (SAMHSA, 2008).
15In the United States, high rates of substance abuse or dependence are present across most
demographic groups. That said, abuse rates are relatively higher among individuals aged 18-25,
males, less educated, and those living in larger metropolitan areas (SAMHSA, 2011).
16The remaining 4 percent of admissions are related to sedatives, tranquilizers, hallucinogens,
PCP, inhalants, over the counter medications, and other unreported drugs.
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into the relationship between treatment and substance abuse. The majority of
treatment services occur in an outpatient setting—in which clients do not reside at the
treatment site.17 Outpatient care delivers treatment programs and modalities, such
as detoxification, methadone maintenance, regular outpatient, adolescent outpatient,
and drug-court programs (SAMHSA, 2009). For more serious substance-abuse
problems, facilities provide residential treatment in which clients temporarily live
at the treatment site (e.g. inpatient detoxification, chemical dependency programs,
therapeutic communities). While treatment modalities vary substantially and often
target particular demographic groups or specific drug addictions, all modalities share
similar goals to mitigate the consequences of drug abuse, encourage healthier lifestyles,
and, ideally, promote abstinence among drug abusers.
Despite treatment innovations and a wide array of treatment options, drug-
related problems continue to rise. In particular, drug-overdose deaths—a particularly
costly consequence of drug abuse—have increased sixfold since 1980, with the most
recent increases being largely attributable to a rise in prescription-drug abuse such
as opioid analgesics (e.g. morphine, codeine, hydrocodone, oxycodone, fentanyl, and
methadone).18 For instance, over the past decade prescription opioid-related deaths
have tripled and accounted for 40 percent of all drug-poisoning deaths in 2008. In
the same year, heroine and cocaine—common recreational drugs—together account
for approximately 20 percent of drug-poisoning deaths (Warner et al, 2011).
17Outpatient treatment services account for 90 percent of reported clients. The remaining
admissions are provided in residential (9 percent) and hospital inpatient (1 percent) settings
(SAMHSA, 2008).
18In the case of prescription drug abuse—where the majority of drug abusers obtain drugs from
family or friends—typical supply-side interventions may be less effective relative to strategies such
as treatment (SAMHSA, 2011).
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In light of these trends, it is perhaps surprising that drug-induced mortality
receives little attention within either the context of treatment or analyses of other
drug-control interventions. For instance, in a recent review of opioid-dependence
therapies Amato et al (2005) highlight that mortality is “seldom taken into account
to assess the efficacy of treatments [due to the lack of long-term follow up in clinical
trials].”
Data
To identify county-level changes in the number of substance-abuse treatment
facilities, I use data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns
(CBP). CBP data report the annual number of substance-abuse treatment clinics
(a single physical location) in each U.S. county for both outpatient and residential
facilities from 1998-2008.19 Although classified separately in the CBP data, residential
and outpatient establishments often offer both residential and outpatient treatment
services. For instance, 35 percent of facilities offering residential care also offer
outpatient care.20 Therefore, estimating the effects separately for outpatient and
residential facilities would not be informative as residential and outpatient services are
not distinctly identified. As such, I combine outpatient and residential classifications,
using the total count of establishments as an indicator for county-level provision of
substance-abuse treatment.
19The following six-digit NAICS codes identify treatment establishments: 621420 —“Outpatient
mental health and substance abuse centers” and 623220—“Residential Mental Health and Substance
Abuse Facilities.” 55 percent of facilities within the sample are classified as outpatient centers. Many
of these facilities also offer mental health services, though according to N-SSATS (2008) only 8
percent of known facilities indicate a primary focus on mental health services.
20Based on author’s calculations using 2002-2008 N-SSATS data.
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To calculate drug-induced mortality rates, I use restricted-use National Center
for Health Statistics Multiple Cause of Death Data and population data from the
National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results (Cancer-
SEER) program.21 I measure drug-induced mortality using causes of death with
specific reference to drug-induced poisoning, identified by International Classification
of Diseases (ICD) codes.22 Over the sample, drug-poisoning deaths average 25,286
annually and account for nine out of ten deaths categorized by the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) as drug induced.23 Notably, drug-poisoning deaths
are a relatively acute outcome, plausibly responsive to annual changes in treatment
availability and are not inclusive of deaths that result from adverse effects of properly
administered substances, such as an allergic reaction to a prescribed dosage, where
we would not expect treatment to have a meaningful impact.
I limit my analysis to U.S. counties with at least one treatment facility over the
1998-2008 time period and counties with available identifiers in the 48 contiguous
states.24 The resulting data include drug-induced mortality and treatment facility
data for 2,409 counties in 48 states, spanning 11 years.25 In table 1 Column (1) I
21As reported by Stevens et al (2011), the Cancer-Seer population data are more accurate than data
interpolated from the Census because they “are based on an algorithm that incorporates information
from Vital statistics, IRS migration files, and the Social Security database.” The Cancer-SEER
population data are also used to construct county-by-year demographic controls.
22See Appendix Table 24 for a breakdown of ICD-10 and ICD-9 codes used in this analysis. This
measure of drug-induced deaths also includes alcohol poisonings, which account for 1.2 percent of
drug-induced deaths.
23The remaining CDC categories of drug-induced causes include deaths from chronic drug use,
leading to medical conditions such mental and behavioral disorders or other long-term drug-induced
diseases which may not be responsive to annual changes in treatment provision. For a complete list
of deaths categorized as drug induced by the CDC see Kochanek et. al (2011).
24Specifically, I drop all counties in HI and AK in addition to 14 total counties in MT, VA, CO,
and FL, where county identifiers are inconsistent or unavailable. I assume zero facilities when none
are reported in a given year.
25Over the same time-frame, the aggregate number of facilities increases from 12,019 to 15,411.
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present summary statistics, indicating an average of 49 facilities and 9.4 annual drug-
induced deaths per 100,000 residents. Importantly, there is substantial variation in
the number of facilities, with the average county experiencing 21 facility openings and
10 closings from 1998 to 2008.26 Column (1) also shows relatively higher drug-induced
mortality rates for males, whites, and individuals ages 15-64.
Empirical Strategy
I begin by estimating a simple model that relates a county’s drug-induced
mortality rate to its number of treatment facilities:
Mortalityct = αc + αt + θFacilityc,t−1 + ct, (4.1)
where Mortalityct is the drug-induced mortality rate per 100,000 residents in county
c in year t, αc and αt are county and year fixed effects, Facilityc,t−1 is the number
of substance-abuse treatment facilities in county c in year t− 1, and ct is a random
error term.
This model includes county fixed effects to account for fixed county
characteristics that may correlate with drug-induced mortality. So, for example,
inherent differences between urban and rural counties or time-invariant measures of
county public services and drug-control policies will not confound the estimates. I
also include year fixed effects to account for aggregate time-varying shocks such as
aggregate economic conditions and changes in the national drug-control strategy. My
primary measure of facilities is the count of substance-abuse treatment facilities lagged
one time period—implicitly assuming that previous year facility openings and closings
26Here I define an opening as a net increase in the number of facilities from one year to the next
and define closings similarly.
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impact current year drug-induced deaths.27 For this and all subsequent specifications,
I apply county-population weights and correct for possible clustered standard errors
at the county level, as errors may be correlated across years within a given county.28
Using this baseline approach, θ measures the extent to which a county’s drug-
induced mortality rate deviates from its average as the number of treatment facilities
changes within that county, controlling for common shocks. If θˆ is the causal effect of
one additional treatment facility, one must assume that the annual variation in the
number of treatment facilities within a county is orthogonal to other determinants of
drug-induced mortality. I relax this assumption in Eq. (2) by controlling for state-by-
year fixed effects and a rich set of county-by-year controls. In particular, I estimate
the following regression equation:
Mortalitycst = αc + γst + θFacilitycs,t−1 + βXcst + cst, (4.2)
where the notation is similar to Eq. (1), γst are state-by-year fixed effects, and Xcst is
a set of county-by-year controls, including the unemployment rate, firm births, per-
capita income, the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per 100,000,
and the fraction of the county population that are: white, black, male, less than 18
years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old.
State-by-year fixed effects flexibly control for state-specific shocks such as changes
in state-level policy measures influencing drug-abuse. For example, these controls will
27In Appendix Table 27, I also show estimates based on models with additional lags. The estimates
are consistent with the prior that previous year investments in treatment facilities impact current
year mortality rates. Relatedly, I show that there is no significant relationship between current-
year mortality rates and subsequent-year number of treatment facilities, addressing the concern that
counties are responding to increased drug-deaths by investing in additional facilities.
28In Appendix Table 25, I explore estimates using unweighted models. As expected given recent
research by Solon, Haider, and Woolridge (2013) the estimates are similar but estimated with slightly
less precision than the weighted estimates which correct for heteroskedstic errors.
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account for year-to-year changes in funding for health and law-enforcement services
which typically originate at the state or federal level.
Eq. (2) also controls for year-to-year changes in county-year covariates including
demographic composition, local economic conditions, law enforcement, and crime.
Including demographic controls speaks to the concern that age-, race-, or gender-
related compositional changes in a county’s population may affect drug-induced
mortality rates and investments in treatment. The controls for local economic
conditions include county unemployment rates, the number of new firm births, and
per-capita incomes.29 These controls account for the possibility that treatment
facilities and drug-induced deaths are correlated with local economic conditions.
In particular, existing studies indicate that unhealthy behaviors and mortality
are typically pro-cyclical; with mortality-rates and unhealthy behaviors such as
alcohol consumption, smoking and physical inactivity increasing in response to better
economic conditions (Ruhm 2005, 2006).30 Inasmuch as drug-induced mortality
follows a similar pattern and facility openings are pro-cyclical, excluding these controls
would lead to a downward bias.
Finally, including controls for the number of law-enforcement officers and county-
level crime rates addresses the concern that counties respond to drug-related problems
by investing in law-enforcement interventions.31 These controls are important, for
instance, if expenditures toward law enforcement are a substitute for investments in
29County unemployment rates are from the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Firm births
include all county-level firm births reported by the U.S. Census Statistics of U.S. Businesses. Per
capita income was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Local Area Personal Income
Data.
30Mortality also increases with income receipt as measured by transfer payments, tax rebates, and
social security benefits (Dobkin and Puller, 2007; Evans and Moore, 2010).
31The number of law-enforcement officers and county-level crime rates are calculated using
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports and agency-specific employment reports available in the Law
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) database.
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substance-abuse treatment. In such a case, not including controls for the number
of officers would result in downward biased estimates. Alternatively, co-occurring
investments in enforcement and treatment would yield an upward bias.32
Together, the inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects and county-by-year
covariates in Eq. (2) addresses concerns regarding omitted variables that may be
systematically related to the number of facilities and drug-overdose deaths. That
said, one could argue that other unobservable factors may confound the estimates. As
such, the degree to which including the current set of controls affects the magnitude
and precision of the estimates is informative regarding the exogeneity of county-
level facility openings. For instance, if the estimates are not particularly sensitive
to the inclusion of these county-by-year covariates, we can be more confident that
related unobservables are similarly not crucial for identification. Alternatively, if the
estimates are sensitive to county-by-year controls, we may be more concerned about
other unobservable factors.
With this specification, the estimate of θ is the extent to which changes in a
county’s drug-induced mortality rate (relative to its average) respond to changes in the
number of facilities, controlling for state-specific time shocks and other covariates.33
As a robustness check to this approach, in Appendix Table 26 I also report estimates
using Poisson models and find results consistent with the OLS estimates.
An outstanding concern is whether or not individuals seek treatment outside the
border of their county of residence. Given the that the the average county has 49
32In Appendix Table 28, I assess the importance of these issues by estimating models considering
how the number of facilities responds to local economic conditions, law enforcement, and crime.
While the number of facilities does seem weakly related to local economic conditions, changes in law
enforcement and crime are not predictive of openings and closings.
33In Section 5.2, I also estimate models using mortality rates of various demographic groups as
the dependent variable to explore heterogeneous effects.
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facilities and that 90 percent of admissions occur in an outpatient setting requiring
frequent travel to the facility, it seems reasonable to assume that most treatment
occurs within the county of residence. That said, inasmuch as crossing county borders
to seek treatment does occur, the estimates would understate the effect of a treatment
facility.
Results
Effects on Drug-Induced Mortality
In Table 17 I present regression results based on the models specified in Eq. (1)
and Eq. (2). In columns (1) through (5) I show a progression of estimates, starting
with the baseline model in Column (1) and leading to my most-flexible specification
in Column (5). Including county and year fixed effects, the estimate in Column (1)
suggests that an additional facility reduces a county’s drug-induced mortality rate by
0.036 (0.39 percent) per 100,000 residents and is significant at the one-percent level. In
columns (2) through (5), I add state-by-year fixed effects as well as county-level time-
varying controls for demographic changes, local economic conditions, and measures for
law enforcement officers and crime. That the estimates are not particularly sensitive
to these additional controls—remaining significant and similar in magnitude—lends
confidence that variation in the number of county-level facilities is not systematically
related to other county-level determinants of drug-induced mortality.
In Column (5), the estimate indicates a significant 0.4 percent decline in drug-
induced mortality associated with an additional treatment facility. To put the
magnitude into context, the estimate suggests that a 10 percent increase in the
number of facilities decreases a county’s drug-induced mortality rate by 2 percent.
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The estimates together provide evidence that treatment, as measured by expansions
in treatment facilities, does reduce drug-induced mortality.
Heterogeneous Responses to Treatment Facilities
In tables 18, 19, and 20, I explore the extent to which there are heterogeneous
effects of treatment facilities on drug-induced mortality across age, race, gender, and
county characteristics. Documenting any differential effects of treatment provides
useful information for public policy and practitioners of treatment and speaks to
the possibility that my main results are driven by a particular demographic group.
Moreover, differential responses to treatment are interesting as the propensity toward
addiction and overdose, and the likelihood of seeking treatment varies dramatically by
individual characteristics and circumstances. Accordingly, in the following sections, I
also provide context as to the recent trends in substance abuse and treatment across
different groups.
Heterogeneity by Age
As highlighted in Table 16, drug-induced mortality rates vary substantially
across age categories. Figure 6 further emphasizes these differences, depicting the
age profiles of these deaths and how they have changed over time. In particular,
drug-induced mortality increases dramatically from 1998-2008 and follows a similar
pattern—increasing then decreasing with age, with the highest mortality rates among
the age 20-60 demographic. As such, when considering potential lives saved through
treatment, this age demographic is of particular interest.
In Table 18, I present the estimated effects of treatment facilities on age-specific
drug-induced mortality rates. Column (1) again provides the main result for all
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ages for comparison and columns (2) through (10) present the estimates in age bins
of 10 years. Column (2) indicates no effect upon children less than 10, which is
not surprising as drug-induced deaths of young children are primarily accidental
poisonings and should not respond to changes in the number of facilities. In contrast,
the remaining estimates for individuals older than 10—columns (3) through (10)—
suggest significant reductions in drug-induced mortality. Though the magnitudes of
the point estimates generally increase then decrease with age, there are no significants
differences in the percentage impacts among individuals older than 10 years.
Perhaps contrary to our priors, expansions in treatment facilities also reduce
drug-induced mortality among older populations (columns (8) and (9)). That said,
from 2004-2009 substance-abuse treatment admissions of adults ages 50 or older have
more than doubled, with older-adult treatment-admission rates increasing relative
to those of younger adults.34 These admissions are primarily driven by alcohol and
prescription-drug abuse, though recent research suggests increasing use of illicit drugs,
such as cocaine and heroin, among older adults (Arndt, Clayton, and Schultz, 2011).35
Heterogeneity by Race and Gender
I next explore the extent to which mortality rates by race and gender differentially
respond to the number of treatment facilities. A breakdown by race is interesting
as the type and severity of drug abuse often correlates with race and, as such, we
may expect a differential response to treatment. Figure 2 Panel A presents the race-
34In 2005, TEDS reports 4,622 treatment admissions for individuals age 70 or older. For a
discussion of substance-abuse disorders in the elderly see Menninger (2002).
35To explore this issue further, in Appendix Table 29 I consider the extent to which there are
differential effects of treatment facilities on alcohol-poisoning mortality rates across age categories.
The estimates suggest that facilities significantly affect alcohol-poisoning mortality rates only among
individuals ages 40-79, with the largest effects among older adults ages 60-79. As such, reductions in
alcohol-poisoning deaths account for at least a small part of the relatively large percentage impact
on elderly adult drug-induced deaths in Table 18.
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specific drug-induced mortality rates over the sample time frame, showing white rates
surpassing those for blacks beginning in 2002. These trends are consistent with recent
increases in prescription-drug abuse primarily among whites and—prior to 2002—
relatively high black mortality rates corresponding with high rates of drug abuse
(driven primarily by heroin and cocaine) among blacks.36
In Table 19, I first show the estimated effects by race after displaying the estimate
for the full sample in Column (1). The magnitude of the percentage impacts across
columns (2) through (4) indicate a relatively large effect of treatment on drug-induced
mortality among minorities. In particular, an additional treatment facility reduces
black mortality rates by 0.48 percent. Given that there are relatively few blacks in
many counties, I also consider estimates restricting the sample to counties within
the highest tercile of proportion of county residents that are black (greater than 8
percent black). The estimates—presented in Table A3 in the Appendix—indicate an
even larger percentage impact (0.81) on drug-induced mortality rates among blacks.
I also estimate models focusing on gender-specific mortality rates. As highlighted
in Table 16 and Panel B of Figure 7, drug-induced mortality rates are higher for males
than females throughout 1998-2008. In addition, males account for 70 percent of
reported treatment admissions (SAMSHA, 2009). That said, existing studies suggest
that treatment initiation, completion, and time spent in treatment do not differ by
gender (Green et al, 2002). The estimates, shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table
19, indicate a 0.4 percentage impact of treatment facilities on drug-induced mortality
rates for males and females.
36For a discussion of trends in drug-induced deaths and drug abuse by race see Paulozzi and
Annest, 2007.
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Heterogeneity Across County Types
In Table 20, I show estimates stratified by county urban classification and per-
capita income. The motivation for doing so is to consider differential effects of
treatment facilities across place environments—which have been shown to contribute
to differences in substance abuse and related outcomes. In particular, abuse rates
are generally higher in urban areas and among individuals with low socioeconomic
status (SAMHSA, 2011). That said, looking across urban classifications, Figure 8
shows only a small and declining difference between urban and rural drug-induced
mortality rates.
After displaying the estimate based on the full sample, columns (2) through
(3) separately consider the effect for large urban counties, medium and small urban
counties, and rural counties, using the National Center for Heath Statistics (NCHS)
urban-rural classification scheme for counties.37 Column (1) indicates an estimated
effect of 0.37 in large urban counties (average population of 1.4 million), Column
(2) shows a slightly smaller effect in medium and small urban counties (average
population of 164,000), and Column (3) indicates no significant effect of treatment
facilities in rural counties (average population of 30,000). Reasons for the lack of
an effect in rural counties may include relatively low substance-abuse rates, high
stigma of seeking treatment, or relatively few treatment options in rural counties.38
Notably however, the larger counties considered in columns (1) and (2) account for
approximately 85 percent of the total population in the sample.
37See 2006 NCHS Urban-Rural Classification Scheme for Counties.
38The average number of substance-abuse treatment facilities in large urban, medium/small urban
and rural counties is, respectively, 122, 20 and 2.
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In columns (4) through (6), the estimates are stratified by per-capita incomes,
where “low income” counties are defined as those with average per capita incomes
in the lowest tercile, and medium- and high-income counties are defined similarly.
Though the results are relatively noisy for low-income counties, the estimates provide
evidence that the effect of treatment facilities is relatively large in counties with low
average per-capita incomes.
Broadly speaking, tables 3-5 offer suggestive evidence that particular
demographic groups and place environments are more responsive to treatment
interventions. That said, the percentage responses to treatment are typically similar
in magnitude and—with few exceptions—negative and precisely estimated, suggesting
that the benefits of treatment facilities are quite broad and not driven by any one
group in particular.
Effects on Other Causes of Death
In this section, I investigate whether treatment facilities affect other causes of
mortality. Though it is likely that substance-abuse treatment affects other causes of
death, the expected sign of the effect is unknown. On one hand, a decline in drug-
induced deaths may lead to an increase in other causes of death consistent with the
competing risks model (see e.g. Arthur, 1981; Honore and Lleras-Muney, 2006). In
particular, a host of risk factors act as competing influences contributing to mortality.
As such, we might expect a decrease in drug-induced deaths to lead to an increase
in deaths related to competing mortality risks such as motor-vehicle accidents or
suicides. On the other hand and perhaps more likely, positive spillovers of substance-
abuse treatment may lead to declines in other causes of death. As substance abuse
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has far-reaching effects on general health outcomes, drug-induced deaths may be one
of many causes of death reduced by treatment.
As such, an analysis of the effects on other causes of death should not be thought
of as a typical falsification exercise. However, in the context of identifying an effect
of substance-abuse treatment, the extent to which the effects on non-drug-induced
causes of death are smaller in magnitude is informative regarding the validity of the
research design. Moreover, to the extent that drug treatment does reduce other causes
of death, we would expect there to be a link between these deaths and drug abuse.
In this setting—where the number of deaths across causes varies widely—a
natural approach is to estimate a log-linear model, where the estimates represent the
percentage effect of an additional facility on mortality rates.39 After first plotting
the estimated effect on drug-induced mortality, Figure 9 provides the estimated
effects on all causes, all causes excluding drug-induced deaths, and deaths associated
with cardiovascular disease, cancer, infection / immune deficiency, other disease
(respiratory, kidney and degenerative brain diseases), motor-vehicle accidents, suicide,
and homicide.40 The estimates indicate a relatively large effect of facilities on
drug-induced mortality rates, lending added confidence that the research design is
identifying an effect of treatment. In particular, the estimated effect on drug induced
mortality rates (.5 percent) suggests that these deaths are much more responsive to
treatment facilities than any other cause of death.
That said, the estimates also provide evidence for positive spillovers of treatment
leading to fewer deaths associated with infection / immune deficiency, suicide, and
39To avoid dropping county-year observations with zero deaths, I replace zeros with ones before
calculating the mortality rates. Results from Poisson regressions are similar to the results from the
log-linear specification.
40See the Appendix Table 24 for specific ICD-10 and ICD-9 codes used for each category. I define
cause of death categories similar to Stevens et al 2011
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homicide.41 These deaths contribute to a decline in the all causes category in Figure
9 and are plausibly related to drug abuse. For instance, drug abusers—injection
abusers in particular—are at a high risk for infection and, moreover, substance abuse
is generally associated with immune deficiencies (Sacerdote, 2006)42 Similarly, there
is a well-documented relationship between drug abuse and deaths related to suicide
and homicide (Moscicki, 1995; Brownstein et al., 1992).
Deaths of individuals over the age of 65—accounting for the majority of deaths
in Figure 9—likely add considerable noise to these estimates. As such, in Figure 10 I
show results from the same models using log mortality rates of individuals less than
65 years old as dependent variables. In Figure 10 we see similar evidence of positive
spillovers of treatment reducing deaths related to infection / immune deficiency,
suicide and homicide. Combined with the effect on drug-induced mortality, these
effects contribute to relatively small percentage declines in mortality rates related to
all causes and non-drug induced causes. Once again, the estimated effects across all
non-drug induced causes of death in Figure 10 are much smaller than the estimated
effect on drug-induced mortality. Taken together, figures 9 and 10 suggest that
treatment saves lives among other causes of death, consistent with positive spillovers
of reduced drug abuse, but that the percentage impact is much larger for drug-induced
deaths.
41Appendix table 31 show similar results using the linear model previously specified in Eq. (2).
42Within the ICD codes comprising the infections and immune deficiencies category, hepatitis C,
sepsis, and entercolitis are particularly responsive to treatment facilities. In each case, substance
abuse is a plausible contributing factor.
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Estimates Using Alternative Data on Facilities
To lend added confidence to my main results and provide insight into an
underlying mechanism associated with treatment, in this section I estimate models
using several additional data sources. I first estimate the effect of treatment facilities
on drug-induced mortality using data which offer the ability to focus specifically on
treatment facilities that are licensed or certified to provide substance-abuse treatment.
I then estimate models that consider the effect of treatment facilities on substance-
abuse treatment admissions using administrative admissions data.
N-SSATS and TEDS Data
As an alternative source to measure the number of county substance-abuse
treatment facilities, I use the National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment
Services (N-SSATS)—a survey administered to “all organized substance abuse
treatment facilities known to SAMHSA [Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration].” Though N-SSSATS provides valuable facility-specific details not
available in CBP data, it has several shortcomings. In particular, in addition to being
voluntary survey-based data, N-SSATS spans a shorter time-period than CBP data
and does not correspond to the calendar year—instead providing a count of facilities
at varying reference dates. In the analysis, I use N-SSATS data from 2002-2008—
throughout which there is a consistent reference date of March.
These shortcomings noted, the detail available in N-SSATS offers some
advantages. First, in my analysis of drug-induced mortality, these data allow me to
consider a sample of facilities that are not concurrently providing primary health care
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and are licensed or certified to provide substance-abuse treatment.43,44 As such, this
measure uses facilities that are particularly focused on substance-abuse treatment.
Second, N-SSATS data separately identify funded and unfunded facilities, which
is important when I consider the effect of facilities on substance-abuse treatment
admissions. That is, county-level treatment admissions data are largely only available
for publicly-funded facilities. Therefore, unlike CBP data, using N-SSATS data
provides the ability to consider the effect of an additional funded facility on treatment
admissions into funded facilities.
Substance-abuse treatment admissions data come from the Treatment Episodes
Data Set (TEDS). TEDS is a national data-set collected by SAMHSA from state
administrative systems and includes information on approximately 2 million annual
substance-abuse treatment admissions. While publicly available by Metropolitan
Statistical Area, in this analysis I use a special tabulation of TEDS which includes
county-level admissions from 2002-2008. In this data, an admission is the initiation
of a treatment episode in a non-hospital facility, where the duration of an episode
can vary from days to months depending on the the type of service and completion
of treatment.45
As alluded to previously, TEDS is not a census of all substance-abuse treatment
admissions. These data primarily represent admissions into publicly-funded facilities
and, with few exceptions, do not include admissions into facilities not receiving public
funds. Focusing on a clear measure of admissions into publicly-funded facilities, I
43Approximately 95% of surveyed facilities are licensed or certified. Facilities offering primary
health care account for 2 percent of all surveyed facilities.
44Primary care facilities account for 1-2 percent of all surveyed facilities. These sample restrictions
are not made when analyzing treatment admissions as these categories of facilities may also report
treatment admissions.
45As facilities may admit an individual multiple times within the calendar year, the admission
count does not necessarily represent unique individuals.
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restrict the sample to states that require publicly-funded facilities to report treatment
admissions, in total dropping 4 states from the analysis of treatment admissions
(Arkansas, Colorado, Maryland, and Massachusetts).46,47
Using these data, I employ sample restrictions similar to my main analysis—
focusing on U.S. counties with at least one treatment facility from 2002-2008, counties
within the 48 contiguous states and dropping counties with inconsistent or unavailable
county identifiers. In Table 21 I show summary statistics for the samples using N-
SSATS to identify treatment facilities, with Column (1) showing the statistics for the
sample used to consider effects on drug-induced mortality and Column (2) showing
the same for the sample used to consider treatment admissions. These statistics are
largely similar to those in Table 1, with Column (2) also reporting an average of 7,192
county-level treatment admissions.
Effects on Drug-Induced Mortality
Analogous to Table 2, I first estimate the effect of treatment facilities on a
county’s drug-induced mortality rate. Using the models specified in Eq. (1) and Eq.
(2), Table 22 presents these estimates, starting with the most parsimonious model
in Column (1) and concluding with my most flexible specification in Column (5).
The estimates across columns (1) through (5) closely resemble those based on CBP
data, similarly indicating a significant effect of treatment facilities on drug-induced
mortality rates. In particular, Column (6) indicates that that an additional facility
46The resulting sample includes 43 states.
47While approximately 60 percent of all facilities do receive public funds, there remain substantial
differences in state-reporting requirements that introduce uncertainty as to the portion of all
admissions actually accounted for by TEDS. For instance, some states report only publicly funded
admissions instead of all admissions in facilities receiving funding. Also, some states allow voluntary
reporting of admissions into unfunded facilities.
71
reduces a county’s drug-induced mortality-rate by 0.32 percent—slightly smaller than
the impact in Table 17 (0.40 percent).
Effects on Treatment Admissions
I next estimate the effect of changes in the number of publicly-funded facilities on
treatment admissions into publicly funded facilities. Using N-SSATS data allows me
to separately construct counts of the number of funded and unfunded facilities in each
county. While I am particularly interested in the coefficient on the number of funded
facilities—corresponding to my measure of treatment admissions—I also control for
changes in the number of unfunded facilities. That is, funded-facility admissions
are likely not independent of the number of unfunded facilities.48 For instance, an
additional unfunded facility may decrease reported admissions into funded facilities
as individuals opt towards treatment at the unfunded facility. In this case, not
accounting for changes in unfunded facilities would lead to a downward bias in the
estimated effect of an additional funded facility. Alternatively, if increases in funded
facilities correspond with decreases in unfunded facilities, the estimate may overstate
the effect of an additional funded facility on treatment admissions.
As such, Table 23 presents estimates separately accounting for the number of
funded and unfunded facilities. Once again progressively adding controls, columns
(1) through (5) show a significant relationships between treatment admissions and the
number of funded facilities. In Column (5), the estimate suggests that one additional
funded facility leads to 26 additional treatment admissions. Not surprisingly, the
estimates crucially depend on accounting for the number of unfunded facilities. In
48In recent work, Cohen, Freeborn, and McManus (2013) consider the market for outpatient
substance-abuse treatment in small rural counties and find that public outpatient clinics crowd out
their privately-owned counterparts. As private facilities are less likely to receive funding, this further
stresses the importance of controlling for the number of unfunded facilities in my specifications.
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particular, the results suggest that increases in unfunded facilities decrease admissions
into unfunded facilities. That the estimate on unfunded facilities is relatively large
in magnitude is somewhat unexpected, but plausible as unfunded facilities are more
likely to offer outpatient services—a setting which accounts for the bulk of treatment
admissions—and are more likely to offer ancillary services. Moreover, private-for-
profit facilities are less likely to receive public funding and may incorporate newer
ideas and technologies, attracting relatively more patients.
It is important to note that admissions provide one potential mechanism whereby
treatment facilities may affect drug-induced mortality. Other mechanisms—including
perceptions toward treatment or factors influencing the quality and accessibility
treatment—may also contribute to declines in substance abuse. On the margin it
is not clear which mechanisms are most important in reducing fatal overdoses. That
treatment admissions do respond to the number of facilities, the estimates in Table
23 can be thought of as “proof of concept,” demonstrating that treatment facilities
lead to a change in an underlying factor associated with treatment. That said, given
these many potential mechanisms and that these estimates are based on a subset
of facilities, one should not interpret the estimated effect of treatment facilities on
drug-induced mortality in the context of treatment admissions.
Discussion and Conclusion
The recent dramatic rise in drug-overdose deaths has become an increasingly
important public-health concern. In this paper, I provide evidence for the efficacy
of substance-abuse treatment—as measured by treatment-facility openings and
closings—in reducing these deaths. My main specification suggests that increasing
the number of treatment facilities by 10 percent would lead to a 2 percent decline
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in the drug-induced mortality rate. The estimates are robust across a range of
individual and county characteristics, though the benefits of treatment facilities are
more pronounced among racial minorities, in urban counties, and in counties with low
per-capita incomes. Offering evidence that the expansion of facilities is associated
with an underlying mechanism of treatment, I show that an additional treatment
facility leads to an increase in treatment admissions. My results also suggest indirect
benefits of treatment in reducing other causes of death likely related to drug abuse.
Together, the estimates indicate that an additional facility reduces mortality
by 1.2 total deaths in the average county per year. Considering these mortality
benefits alone, a back of the envelope calculation suggests that the economic value of
expansions in treatment facilities exceeds the associated costs. In particular, facilities
average 276 annual admissions at an average cost of $2,515 per admission.49 Given
the total annual cost of a facility ($694,140) and the estimated reduction in mortality
(1.2 deaths), the cost of saving one life is approximately $578,450 which is far less
than the accepted range of estimates for the value of a statistical life.50
As a whole, the results offer encouraging support for the efficacy of substance-
abuse treatment in reducing drug-related mortality, which is particularly relevant
given the concern that current enforcement policies are ineffective. Moreover, as
mortality is a relatively infrequent consequence of drug abuse, the estimates may only
capture a small portion of the benefits of substance-abuse treatment. As such, these
findings also highlight the need to better understand the extent to which treatment
49The average annual admissions are calculated using 2002-2008 N-SSATS data and the costs of
admission are based on the Alcohol and Drug Services Study (Shepard et. al, 2003).
50For example, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) find that the median value of a statistical life (VSL) in
the US is approximately $7 million and Aldy and Viscusi (2008) estimate age-group specific VSLs
as follows: $3.2 million (ages 18-24), $9.9 million (25-34), $9.9 million (35-44), $8 million (45-54)
and $3.8 million (55-62).
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can affect other drug-related outcomes such as crime, labor productivity, and child
abuse.
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APPENDIX A
FIGURES AND TABLES
FIGURE 1. Normalized GPAs by Age Adjusted for Individual, Accumulated Credits,
and Course-type Fixed Effects
Notes: This figure plots average residuals from a regression of students’ normalized GPAs on
individual fixed effects, fixed effects for a student’s cumulative credits at the beginning of a term,
subject-by-level fixed effects, and term fixed effects.
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FIGURE 2. Responses to the question: “Of the 12 regular-season University of
Oregon football games in the 2010 season, how many did you watch on TV or in
person?”
Notes: The sample has been limited to students who have been at the university for 2 or more
years.
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FIGURE 3. Does Athletic Success Affect the Gender Gap in GPAs?
Notes: The sample is limited to fall term grades. The gender gap is defined as mean male GPA
less mean female GPA, at the term level. Win percentage is the ratio of the University of Oregon
football team’s wins to total games played in a given season. A regression of the winning percentage
on the gender gap (i.e., a model with only nine observations) yields an estimated coefficient of -0.069
with a standard error of 0.025.
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FIGURE 4. Responses to the question: “Does the success of the University of Oregon
football team decrease the amount of time you study for classes?”
Notes: The sample has been limited to students who have been at the university for 2 or more
years.
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FIGURE 5. Responses to the question: “Compared to a loss, when the football team
wins I tend to...”
Alcohol consumption Partying
Studying Missing Class
Notes: The sample has been limited to students who have been at the university for 2 or more
years.
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FIGURE 6. Age Profiles of Drug-Related Mortality
Notes: The drug-induced mortality rate is the number of drug poisonings per 100,000 residents.
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FIGURE 7. Drug-Induced Mortality by Race and Gender
Notes: The drug-induced mortality rate is the number of drug poisonings per 100,000 residents.
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FIGURE 8. Drug-Induced Mortality by Urban Classification
Notes: The drug-induced mortality rate is the number of drug poisonings per 100,000 residents.
Urban and Rural categories are based on the National Center for Heath Statistics (NCHS) urban-
rural classification scheme for counties. Counties within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) are
classified as urban while non-MSA counties are classified as rural.
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FIGURE 9. Estimated Effects of Treatment Facilities on Log Mortality (All Ages)
Notes: The figure summarizes the results of regressions using logged drug-induced mortality
rates across multiple causes of death as dependent variables. The figure plots the estimated
coefficients and 95% confidence intervals associated with a change in the number of treatment
facilities. Disease-related causes include respiratory, kidney and degenerative brain diseases.
All estimates control for county-fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, county demographics
demographic composition (fraction of the county population that are: white, black, male,
less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old), county economic
conditions (the unemployment rate, firm births, and per-capita income), and the number of
law enforcement officers and total crimes per 100,000 residents. The estimates are weighted
by county population and standard errors are corrected for possible clustering at the county
level.
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FIGURE 10. Estimated Effects of Treatment Facilities on Log Mortality (Ages less
than 65)
Notes: The figure summarizes the results of regressions using logged drug-induced mortality
rates among individuals less than age 65 across multiple causes of death as dependent
variables. he figure plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals associated
with a change in the number of treatment facilities. Disease-related causes include
respiratory, kidney and degenerative brain diseases. All estimates control for county-fixed
effects, state-by-year fixed effects, county demographics demographic composition (fraction
of the county population that are: white, black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old,
and greater than 64 years old), county economic conditions (the unemployment rate, firm
births, and per-capita income), and the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes
per 100,000 residents. The estimates are weighted by county population and standard errors
are corrected for possible clustering at the county level.
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TABLE 1. Summary Statistics
Four-year Public
Oregon Oregon U.S. Institutions NLSY97
(Sample) (IPEDS) (IPEDS) (Sample)
SAT I Verbal 25th percentile score, incoming students 500 490 464 470
SAT I Verbal 75th percentile score, incoming students 620 610 568 600
SAT I Math 25th percentile score, incoming students 500 500 472 470
SAT I Math 75th percentile score, incoming students 620 610 578 620
Number of undergraduates 13,102 15,983 8,674 2,298
Fraction female 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.54
Fraction white 0.79 0.75 0.67 0.81
Fraction black 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.11
Fraction Hispanic 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.07
Fraction Asian 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.00
Total price for in-state students living on campus 14,734 13,272
Total price out-of-state students living on campus 26,170 20,022
Fraction receiving any financial aid 0.70 0.75
Fraction receiving federal-grant aid 0.18 0.34
Fraction receiving student-loan aid 0.40 0.45
Notes: Data used in the first columns consists of University of Oregon undergraduates from 1998
through 2007. Financial aid statistics shown in the subsequent two columns are calculated using
2004 IPEDS data, while all other statistics in the same columns are calculated using 2003 IPEDS
data. The number of institutions used to calculate the means in the third column range from 352
to 653. NLSY97 sample statistics use the last observed sampling weight for each respondent.
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TABLE 2. RD-based Estimates of The Effect of Turning 21 (And Other Ages) At
The End of Term on Grades
Bandwidth 240 days 240 days 210 days 210 days 180 days 180 days 150 days 120 days 100 days 80 days 80 days 60 days 40 days 20 days
Age Polynomial Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear None None None None
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel A: Estimated Effect of Turning 21
Estimated effect -0.035*** -0.026 -0.033*** -0.030 -0.036** -0.024 -0.031** -0.024 -0.038* -0.037 -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.031* -0.027
(0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.023)
Estimated effect -0.026** -0.031* -0.023** -0.040** -0.030** -0.029 -0.023 -0.018 -0.032 -0.045* -0.075*** -0.080*** -0.072*** -0.047
including controls (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.036)
Observations 156,956 156,956 138,574 138,574 119,608 119,608 100,344 81,589 68,903 54,963 54,963 41,473 27,655 14,239
Panel B: Estimated Effect of Turning 20
Estimated effect -0.017 -0.014 -0.013 -0.023 -0.021 -0.014 -0.009 -0.012 -0.027 -0.047** -0.011 -0.020* -0.027* -0.040*
(0.010) (0.018) (0.011) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.021)
Estimated effect -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.014 -0.013 -0.003 0.008 0.006 -0.011 -0.036 -0.027** -0.029** -0.032* -0.035
including controls (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.027)
Observations 163,568 163,568 144,184 144,184 123,830 123,830 103,701 83,931 70,338 55,546 55,546 41,762 27,790 13,985
Panel C: Estimated Effect of Turning 22
Estimated effect -0.012 -0.016 -0.010 -0.025 -0.018 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 -0.037 -0.034 -0.028** -0.045*** -0.039** 0.002
(0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.028)
Estimated effect -0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.022 -0.013 -0.005 -0.013 -0.008 -0.018 -0.025 -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.037 0.041
including controls (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.025) (0.017) (0.027) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.033) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028) (0.049)
Observations 114,397 114,397 102,009 102,009 88,277 88,277 74,321 60,664 51,108 40,810 40,810 30,747 20,670 10,444
Notes: The dependent variable is a student’s normalized course grade. Controls include course-
by-quarter-by-year fixed effects, birth-year fixed effects, accumulated-credits fixed effects, gender,
math and verbal SAT scores, high-school GPA, and indicator variables for university athlete,
private-school attendance, Black, Hispanic, and Asian. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
corrected for clustering at the date-of-birth level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 3. Fixed-Effects-Based Estimates of the Effect of Legal Access to Alcohol on
Grades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age > 21 During Term -0.146*** -0.097*** -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Individual Fixed Effects no yes yes yes
Accumulated-Credits Fixed Effects no no yes yes
Course-Specific Controls no no no yes
Number of Students 13,102 13,102 13,102 13,102
Observations 479,342 479,342 479,342 479,342
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to the student’s normalized course grade. Accumulated-
credits fixed effects are fixed effects for a student’s accumulated credits at the beginning of a term.
Course-specific controls include subject-by-level fixed effects and term fixed effects. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the individual level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 4. Fixed-Effects-Based Estimates of the Effect of Legal Access to Alcohol
on the Grade Distribution, Course Difficulty, and Course Load
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A B C D or F Expected Course
Grade Grade Grade Grade Term GPA Load
Age > 21 -0.008*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.000 0.009*** 0.053
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.035)
Individual Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Accumulated-Credits Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Course-Specific Controls yes yes yes yes - -
Number of Students 13,102 13,102 13,102 13,102 13,102 13,102
Observations 479,342 479,342 479,342 479,342 146,730 146,730
Notes: The analysis in columns 1–4 is based on data at the at the student-by-course level whereas
the analysis in columns 5–6 is based on data at the student-by-term level (and thus does not control
for course characteristics). The outcome variable for Column 5, a student’s expected term GPA, is
calculated based on the average grades in the previous offering of each course a student is taking
in a given term. The outcome variable for Column 6, course load, is the number of credits taken in
a term. Accumulated-credits fixed effects are fixed effects for a student’s accumulated credits (in
four-credit intervals) at the beginning of a term. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected
for clustering at the individual level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 5. Fixed-Effects-Based Estimates of the Dynamic Effects of Legal Access to
Alcohol on Grades
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turns 21 in 4 terms 0.002
(0.006)
Turns 21 in 3 terms 0.008 0.009
(0.006) (0.008)
Turns 21 in 2 terms 0.004 0.008 0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Turns 21 in 1 term 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Term of 21st birthday -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.027**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Turned 21 1 term ago -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.027** -0.021* -0.020
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Turned 21 2 terms ago -0.026*** -0.025** -0.023* -0.017 -0.015
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Turned 21 3 terms ago -0.031*** -0.030** -0.027** -0.021 -0.020
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Turned 21 4 terms ago -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.051*** -0.044*** -0.043**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
Turned 21 5 terms ago -0.038*** -0.037** -0.035** -0.027 -0.026
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021)
Turned 21 6+ terms ago -0.021 -0.020 -0.017 -0.010 -0.008
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023)
Individual Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Accumulated-Credits Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Course-Specific Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Students 13,102 13,102 13,102 13,102 13,102
Observations 479,342 479,342 479,342 479,342 479,342
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to the student’s normalized course grade. Accumulated-
credits fixed effects are fixed effects for a student’s accumulated credits at the beginning of a term.
Course-specific controls include subject-by-level fixed effects and term fixed effects. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the individual level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 6. Heterogeneity Across Gender, Ability, and Financial-Aid Eligibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Gender and Ability Male Male Female Female
Male Female High Ability Low Ability High Ability Low Ability High Ability Low Ability
Age > 21 During Term -0.024** -0.045*** -0.021** -0.046*** -0.006 -0.047*** -0.039*** -0.051***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
Individual Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Accumulated-Credits Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Course-Specific Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Students 5,903 7,199 6,332 6,770 3,221 2,682 3,111 4,088
Observations 218,479 260,863 234,099 245,243 119,946 98,533 114,153 146,710
Panel B: Gender and Financial Aid Male Male Female Female
Male Female High Eligibility Low Eligibility High Eligibility Low Eligibility High Eligibility Low Eligibility
Age > 21 During Term -0.026** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.040*** -0.045*** -0.015 -0.057*** -0.063***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Individual Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Accumulated-Credits Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Course-Specific Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Students 3,900 5,213 4,556 4,557 1,887 2,013 2,669 2,544
Observations 145,471 190,444 166,504 169,411 69,764 75,707 96,740 93,704
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to the student’s normalized course grade. Accumulated-
credits fixed effects are fixed effects for a student’s cumulative credits at the beginning of a term.
Course-specific controls include subject-by-level fixed effects and term fixed effects. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the individual level. The high-ability group consists
of students with SAT scores above the sample median (1120) while the low-ability group consists
of those with SAT scores at or below the sample median.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
91
TABLE 7. Estimated Effects on Drinking Behaviors During The Previous 30 Days
Using NLSY97 Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Sample Male Female High Ability Low Ability
Male Male Female Female
High Ability Low Ability High Ability Low Ability
Panel A: Drank
Age > 21 0.065*** 0.051** 0.077*** 0.088*** 0.054*** 0.084** 0.026 0.091** 0.072***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.021)
Students 2,298 997 1,301 693 1,419 348 522 313 818
Observations 9,023 3,943 5,080 2,789 5,521 1,422 2,029 1,253 3,203
Pre-21 Mean 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.65
Panel B: Days Drank
Age > 21 1.394*** 1.643*** 1.173*** 1.727*** 1.265*** 1.597*** 1.695*** 2.027*** 0.976***
(0.184) (0.300) (0.227) (0.293) (0.255) (0.443) (0.471) (0.401) (0.304)
Students 2,298 997 1,301 693 1,419 348 522 313 818
Observations 9,023 3,943 5,080 2,789 5,521 1,422 2,029 1,253 3,203
Pre-21 Mean 4.27 4.80 3.83 3.95 4.42 4.42 5.04 3.51 3.97
Panel C: Drinks When Drank
Age > 21 -0.190* -0.234 -0.155 -0.189 -0.147 -0.384 -0.026 0.034 -0.243
(0.111) (0.178) (0.139) (0.169) (0.153) (0.255) (0.256) (0.227) (0.201)
Students 1,905 841 1,064 607 1,147 308 427 271 654
Observations 6,163 2,745 3,418 2,023 3,662 1,045 1,360 908 2,100
Pre-21 Mean 4.54 5.35 3.86 4.31 4.67 4.91 5.60 3.61 4.03
Panel D: Days Drank 5+ Drinks
Age > 21 0.409*** 0.520*** 0.302** 0.377** 0.440*** 0.350 0.403 0.478* 0.319
(0.118) (0.186) (0.151) (0.187) (0.165) (0.278) (0.274) (0.268) (0.211)
Students 2,298 997 1,301 693 1,419 348 522 313 818
Observations 9,023 3,943 5,080 2,789 5,521 1,422 2,029 1,253 3,203
Pre-21 Mean 2.11 2.71 1.61 1.97 2.19 2.39 2.99 1.54 1.66
The sample is restricted to individuals currently enrolled in a four-year college between 1998
and 2009. All regressions are weighted using sampling weights and control for individual fixed
effects and a quadratic in age. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at
the individual level. Consistent with the definitions used in our analysis of University of Oregon
transcript data, the high-ability group consists of students with actual (or ASVAB-predicted) SAT
scores above 1120 while the low-ability group consists of those with scores at or below the 1120.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 8. Summary Statistics
All Students Male Female
Grade Point Average (GPA) 3.04 2.94 3.12
1st Year GPA 3.00 2.90 3.07
2nd Year GPA 3.01 2.92 3.08
3rd Year GPA 3.08 3.00 3.15
4th Year GPA 3.14 3.02 3.24
5+ Year GPA 2.98 2.90 3.10
High-School GPA 3.49 3.40 3.56
SAT 1121 1134 1095
White 0.80 - -
Asian 0.08 - -
Black 0.02 - -
Hispanic 0.04 - -
Winning Percentage 0.70 - -
Number of Undergraduates 29,737 13,184 16,553
Number of Student-Class Observations 267,322 119,191 148,131
Notes: Sample data consist of non-athlete University of Oregon undergraduates from 1999
through 2007. Winning percentage is the ratio of the University of Oregon football team’s
wins to total games played in a given season.
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TABLE 9. Estimated Effect of Athletic Success on Male and Female Grades
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Males
Winning Percentage -0.142*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.039** -0.040** -0.069***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Time Trend no yes yes yes yes no
Student Controls no no yes - - -
Student Fixed Effects no no no yes yes yes
Subject-by-Level Fixed Effects no no no no yes yes
Accumulated-Credits Fixed Effects no no no no no yes
Number of Unique Students 13,184 13,184 13,184 13,184 13,184 13,184
Student-Class Observations 119,191 119,191 119,191 119,191 119,191 119,191
Panel B: Females
Winning Percentage -0.073*** 0.002 0.000 0.034** 0.026* 0.005
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Time Trend no yes yes yes yes no
Student Controls no no yes - - -
Student Fixed Effects no no no yes yes yes
Subject-by-Level Fixed Effects no no no no yes yes
Accumulated-Credits Fixed Effects no no no no no yes
Number of Unique Students 16,553 16,553 16,553 16,553 16,553 16,553
Student-Class Observations 148,131 148,131 148,131 148,131 148,131 148,131
Panel C: Pooled Sample
Winning Percentage -0.073*** 0.004 0.003 0.025 0.024 -0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Male × Winning Percentage -0.069** -0.072** -0.067** -0.052** -0.061** -0.062***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Male -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.077***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
Time Trend no yes yes yes yes no
Student Controls no no yes - - -
Student Fixed Effects no no no yes yes yes
Subject-by-Level Fixed Effects no no no no yes yes
Accumulated-Credits Fixed Effects no no no no no yes
Number of Unique Students 29,737 29,737 29,737 29,737 29,737 29,737
Student-Class Observations 267,322 267,322 267,322 267,322 267,322 267,322
Notes: Panels A and B provide the estimates for male and female students respectively. The
dependent variable is the grade points received by a student in a given class, ranging from 0 to
4.3. Student controls include math and verbal SAT scores, high-school GPA, age, and indicator
variables for, private-school attendance, Black, Hispanic, and Asian. The sample has been limited
to fall-term grades. Winning percentage is the ratio of the University of Oregon football team’s
wins to total games played in a given season. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for
clustering at the student level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 10. Estimated Effects Across Letter Grade Assignments
Outcome: A B C Fail
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Controlling for time
Winning Percentage -0.003 0.017* -0.009 -0.005
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
Male × Winning Percentage -0.008 -0.015 0.008 0.015**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007)
Number of Unique Students 29,737 29,737 29,737 29,737
Student-Class Observations 267,322 267,322 267,322 267,322
Panel B: Controlling for accumulated credits
Winning Percentage -0.007 0.013 -0.007 0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
Male × Winning Percentage -0.010 -0.013 0.009 0.014**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007)
Number of Unique Students 29,737 29,737 29,737 29,737
Student-Class Observations 267,322 267,322 267,322 267,322
Notes: All estimates control for student fixed effects and subject-by-level fixed effects. Panel A
additionally controls for a quadratic in time while Panel B additionally controls for a student’s
accumulated credits at the beginning of the term. The dependent variables are indicator variables
for letter grade assignments corresponding to each column letter. The sample has been limited
to fall term grades. Winning percentage is the ratio of the University of Oregon football team’s
wins to total games played in a given season. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for
clustering at the student level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 11. Estimated Effects on GPAs, By Term
Fall Winter Spring
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Controlling for time
Winning Percentage 0.024 0.002 0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Male × Winning Percentage -0.061** -0.023 -0.018
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Number of Unique Students 29,737 29,490 25,298
Student-Class Observations 267,322 271,489 207,837
Panel B: Controlling for accumulated credits
Winning Percentage -0.001 -0.021 -0.017
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Male × Winning Percentage -0.062*** -0.020 -0.016
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Number of Unique Students 29,737 29,490 25,298
Student-Class Observations 267,322 271,489 207,837
Notes: All estimates control for student fixed effects and subject-by-level fixed effects. Panel A
additionally controls for a quadratic in time while Panel B additionally controls for a student’s
accumulated credits at the beginning of the term. The dependent variable is the grade points
received by a student in a given class, ranging from 0 to 4.3. Placebo quarters include the Winter
and Spring quarters during which the football team does not play any games. Winning percentage
is the ratio of the University of Oregon football team’s wins to total games played in a given season.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the student level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 12. Estimated Effects on GPAs, By Ability and Financial Need
SAT Financial Need
All Low Med High All Low Med High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Controlling for time
Winning Percentage 0.024 0.057** -0.018 0.030 0.035 0.010 0.039 0.054*
(0.015) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.018) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032)
Male × Winning Percentage -0.061** -0.123*** -0.053 -0.036 -0.076*** -0.043 -0.078 -0.109**
(0.024) (0.046) (0.042) (0.037) (0.029) (0.047) (0.048) (0.054)
Number of Unique Students 29,737 9,755 9,554 10,428 20,668 6,927 6,840 6,901
Student-Class Observations 267,322 80,868 86,367 100,087 186,969 64,635 63,169 59,165
Panel B: Controlling for accumulated credits
Winning Percentage -0.001 0.031 -0.040 0.006 0.013 -0.001 0.002 0.035
(0.015) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.018) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032)
Male × Winning Percentage -0.062*** -0.130*** -0.050 -0.040 -0.077*** -0.043 -0.081* -0.106**
(0.024) (0.046) (0.042) (0.037) (0.028) (0.047) (0.048) (0.054)
Number of Unique Students 29,737 9,755 9,554 10,428 20,668 6,927 6,840 6,901
Student-Class Observations 267,322 80,868 86,367 100,087 186,969 64,635 63,169 59,165
Notes: All estimates control for student fixed effects and subject-by-level fixed effects. Panel A
additionally controls for a quadratic in time while Panel B additionally controls for a student’s
accumulated credits at the beginning of the term. The dependent variable is the grade points
received by a student in a given class, ranging from 0 to 4.3. The SAT groups (columns 2-4)
are defined by student SAT score terciles. The financial-need groups (columns 6-8) are defined
by student eligibility terciles. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the
student level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 13. Estimated Effects on GPAs, By Race
All White Non-White Black Hispanic Asian
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Controlling for time
Winning Percentage 0.024 0.011 0.128*** 0.166 0.003 0.150***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.044) (0.155) (0.087) (0.053)
Male × Winning Percentage -0.061** -0.047* -0.170** -0.348 -0.155 -0.114
(0.024) (0.025) (0.069) (0.222) (0.143) (0.083)
Number of Unique Students 29,737 25,844 3,893 482 1,034 2,383
Student-Class Observations 267,322 232,469 34,853 3,968 8,801 22,124
Panel B: Controlling for accumulated credits
Winning Percentage -0.001 -0.012 0.087** 0.093 -0.046 0.113**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.044) (0.154) (0.086) (0.054)
Male × Winning Percentage -0.062*** -0.048* -0.165** -0.317 -0.152 -0.113
(0.024) (0.025) (0.069) (0.228) (0.144) (0.083)
Number of Unique Students 29,737 25,844 3,893 482 1,034 2,383
Student-Class Observations 267,322 232,469 34,853 3,968 8,801 22,124
Notes: All estimates control for student fixed effects and subject-by-level fixed effects. Panel A
additionally controls for a quadratic in time while Panel B additionally controls for a student’s
accumulated credits at the beginning of the term. The dependent variable is the grade points
received by a student in a given class, ranging from 0 to 4.3. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
corrected for clustering at the student level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 14. Estimated Effects on Dropping Out, By Ability and Financial Need
SAT Financial Need
All Low Med High All Low Med High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Winning Percentage -0.014 -0.051*** 0.011 0.004 -0.015 -0.003 -0.008 -0.034*
(0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Male × Winning Percentage 0.004 0.063** -0.023 -0.024 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.006
(0.013) (0.027) (0.022) (0.020) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030)
Male -0.010 -0.047** 0.005 0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.013 -0.003
(0.009) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022)
Time Trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Student Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Accumulated Credits Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Unique Students 26,802 8,702 9,171 8,929 18,627 6,208 6,209 6,210
Student-Class Observations 71,372 22,384 24,476 24,512 49,537 16,643 17,005 15,889
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for not being observed in the next fall quarter or any
subsequent quarter and not having graduated. The dependent variable is undefined for the last
year of data, resulting in fewer observations than our previous analysis. Student controls include
math and verbal SAT scores, high-school GPA, age, and indicator variables for, private-school
attendance, Black, Hispanic, and Asian. The SAT groups (columns 1-3) are defined by student
SAT score terciles. The financial need groups (columns 4-6) are defined by student eligibility
terciles. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the student level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 15. Estimated Effects on Dropping Out, By Race
All White Non-White Black Hispanic Asian
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Winning Percentage -0.014 -0.011 -0.036 -0.138* -0.046 -0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.025) (0.080) (0.051) (0.030)
Male × Winning Percentage 0.004 0.000 0.034 0.225* 0.008 -0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.037) (0.129) (0.075) (0.045)
Male -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.113 -0.006 0.021
(0.009) (0.010) (0.026) (0.094) (0.054) (0.032)
Time Trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Student Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Accumulated Credits Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Unique Students 26,802 23,338 3,464 431 911 2,126
Student-Class Observations 71,372 62,048 9,324 1,100 2,363 5,870
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for not being observed in the next fall quarter or any
subsequent quarter and not having graduated. The dependent variable is undefined for the last
year of data, resulting in fewer observations than our previous analysis. Student controls include
math and verbal SAT scores, high-school GPA, age, and indicator variables for, private-school
attendance, Black, Hispanic, and Asian. The SAT groups (columns 1-3) are defined by student
SAT score terciles. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the student
level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 16. Summary Statistics
(1)
(Drug-Induced Mortality)
Substance-Abuse Treatment Facilities
Facilities 48.68
Facilities (per 100,000) 4.90
Drug-Induced Mortality (per 100,000)
All 9.39
Female 6.67
Male 12.23
White 10.17
Black 8.02
Other 2.96
Ages 0-15 0.18
Ages 15-39 11.05
Ages 40-64 16.36
Ages 65+ 3.29
Counties 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062
Notes: All statistics are weighted by county population. The sample is limited to U.S. counties
within the 48 contiguous states with consistent county identifiers and at least one substance-abuse
treatment facility over the sample time frame (1998-2008).
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TABLE 17. Estimated Effects of Treatment Facilities on Drug-Induced Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Facilities -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
County and Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
State by Year FE no yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls no no yes yes yes
Controls for Economic Conditions no no no yes yes
Controls for Law Enforcement/Crime no no no no yes
Counties 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062
Mean 9.390 9.390 9.390 9.390 9.390
% Impact -0.386 -0.390 -0.399 -0.400 -0.402
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s annual drug-induced mortality rate per 100,000
residents. Demographic controls include the fraction of the county population that are: white,
black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old. Controls for
economic conditions include the unemployment rate, firm births, and per-capita income. Controls
for law enforcement and crime include the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per
100,000 residents. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment facilities in a county by year. The
estimates are weighted by county population and standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected
for possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 18. Heterogeneity in the Effect of Treatment Facilities on Drug-Induced
Mortality by Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Age-adjusted Mortality Rates
All Ages
<10 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+
Number of Facilities -0.038*** -0.000 -0.007** -0.038*** -0.069*** -0.074*** -0.067*** -0.028*** -0.017***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.009) (0.004)
Counties 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062
Mean 9.390 0.170 1.809 10.81 15.34 21.40 13.89 4.927 3.121
% Impact -0.402 -0.167 -0.396 -0.354 -0.450 -0.346 -0.479 -0.564 -0.537
Notes: The dependent variables are a county’s annual age-adjusted drug-induced mortality rate
per 100,000 residents. County-by-year controls include the unemployment rate, firm births, per-
capita income, the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per 100,000 residents, and
the fraction of the county population that are: white, black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64
years old, and greater than 64 years old. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment facilities
in a county by year. The estimates are weighted by county population and standard errors (in
parentheses) are corrected for possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 19. Heterogeneity in the Effect of Treatment Facilities on Drug-Induced
Mortality Across Race and Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All blacks whites other male female
Number of Facilities -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.012** -0.049*** -0.027***
(0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Counties 2,409 2,407 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062 23,975 24,062 24,051 24,062 24,062
Mean 9.390 8.019 10.17 2.960 12.23 6.674
% Impact -0.402 -0.481 -0.386 -0.421 -0.401 -0.402
Notes: The dependent variables area county’s annual demographic-specific drug-induced mortality
rate per 100,000 residents corresponding to each column heading. County-by-year controls include
the unemployment rate, firm births, per-capita income, the number of law enforcement officers
and total crimes per 100,000 residents, and the fraction of the county population that are: white,
black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old. Number of
Facilities is the count of treatment facilities in a county by year. The estimates are weighted by
county population and standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for possible clustering at the
county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 20. Heterogeneity in the Effect of Treatment Facilities on Drug-Induced
Mortality Across County Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Urban Classification Income
All Counties
Large Urban Med/Small Urban Rural Low Med High
Number of Facilities -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.029*** 0.020 -0.087 -0.052** -0.040***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.051) (0.059) (0.025) (0.005)
Counties 2,409 62 916 1,431 802 802 804
County-Year Observations 24,062 610 9,142 14,310 8,020 8,014 8,018
Mean 9.390 10.39 9.006 8.788 9.332 9.065 9.486
% Impact 0.402 0.351 0.323 0.233 0.930 0.574 0.419
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s annual drug-induced mortality rate per 100,000
residents. County-by-year controls include the unemployment rate, firm births, per-capita income,
the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per 100,000 residents, and the fraction of
the county population that are: white, black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and
greater than 64 years old. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment facilities in a county by
year. The estimates are weighted by county population and standard errors (in parentheses) are
corrected for possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 21. Summary Statistics (N-SSATS Data)
(1) (2)
N-SSATS Sample N-SSATS Sample
(Drug-Induced Mortality) (Treatment Admissions)
Substance-Abuse Treatment Facilities
Facilities 34.41 46.51
Facilities (per 100,000) 4.89 3.8
Treatment Admissions - 7,190
Drug-Induced Mortality (per 100,000)
All 10.65 10.55
Female 7.71 7.6
Male 13.73 13.63
White 11.57 11.5
Black 8.67 8.82
Other 3.37 3.15
Ages 0-15 0.22 0.23
Ages 15-39 12.41 12.13
Ages 40-64 18.63 18.64
Ages 65+ 3.58 3.59
Counties 2,182 1,471
County-Year Observations 15,262 8,583
Notes: All statistics are weighted by county population. The samples are limited to U.S. counties
within the 48 contiguous states with consistent county identifiers and at least one substance-
abuse treatment facility over the sample time frame (1998-2008). In Column (1), the sample is
limited to non-primary care facilities that are licensed, certified, or accredited to provide substance-
abuse treatment. The sample in Column (2) includes counties reporting treatment admissions and
is limited to states that require publicly funded facilities to report substance-abuse treatment
admissions.
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TABLE 22. Estimated Effects of Treatment Facilities on Mortality Using N-SSATS
Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Facilities -0.041*** -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
County and Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
State by Year FE no yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls no no yes yes yes
Controls for Economic Conditions no no no yes yes
Controls for Law Enforcement/Crime no no no no yes
Counties 2,182 2,182 2,182 2,182 2,182
County-Year Observations 15,262 15,262 15,262 15,262 15,262
Mean 10.65 10.65 10.65 10.65 10.65
% Impact 0.389 0.302 0.335 0.317 0.317
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s annual drug-induced mortality rate per 100,000
residents. Demographic controls include the fraction of the county population that are: white,
black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old. Controls for
economic conditions include the unemployment rate, firm births, and per-capita income. Controls
for law enforcement and crime include the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per
100,000 residents. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment facilities in a county by year. The
estimates are weighted by county population and standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected
for possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 23. Estimated Effects of Treatment Facilities on SAT Admissions Using
N-SSATS Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Publicly-Funded Facilities 25.817** 26.526** 29.230** 25.658** 26.336**
(12.255) (11.693) (11.676) (11.826) (11.862)
Unfunded Facilities -50.202** -35.418* -34.341** -40.628** -41.065**
(24.104) (18.490) (17.019) (18.913) (18.811)
County and Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
State by Year FE no yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls no no yes yes yes
Controls for Economic Conditions no no no yes yes
Controls for Law Enforcement/Crime no no no no yes
Counties 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471
County-Year Observations 8,583 8,583 8,583 8,583 8,583
Mean 7,190 7,190 7,190 7,190 7,190
% Impact 0.359 0.369 0.407 0.357 0.366
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s annual number of substance-abuse treatment
admissions into publicly-funded facilities. Demographic controls include the fraction of the county
population that are: white, black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than
64 years old. Controls for economic conditions include the unemployment rate, firm births, and
per-capita income. Controls for law enforcement and crime include the number of law enforcement
officers and total crimes per 100,000 residents. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment
facilities in a county by year. The estimates are weighted by county population and standard
errors (in parentheses) are corrected for possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
TABLE 24. Classification of Cause of Death
Death Category ICD-10 (1999-2008) ICD-9 (1998)
Drug-Induced Mortality X40-X45, X60-X65, X85, Y10-Y15 282 Category Recode: 31700, 33800, 35300
Cardiovascular 113 Category Recode: 53-75 72 Category Recode: 320-490
Cancer 113 Category Recode: 19-44 72 Category Recode: 160-250
Disease/Respiratory/Infection R092, N390, D849, F03, F019,
F069 F79, F179, F109, F329, G35,
G122, G319, G409, G419, G459,
G700, G809, G825, G919, G931,
G934, M349, R54, R628, N289
113 Category Recode: 76-89,
1-18, 50, 51,52, 98-102
500, 501, 512, 514, 515, 5070, 5109, 5119, 5130, 5168, 5183,
5184, 5185, 5188, 5191, 5198, 7991, 2791, 2793, 5990, 2900,
2901, 2902, 2904, 2949, 2989, 3109, 311, 319, 3239, 3310,
3314, 3319, 3320, 3352, 340, 3419, 7855, 797, 3440, 3451,
3453, 3459, 3481, 3483, 3485, 3489, 3568, 3580, 5939, 5996,
5920
72 Category Recode: 500-580, 10-140, 650-680
Motor-Vehicle Accidents 113 Category Recode: 115-123 72 Category Recode: 800
Suicide 113 Category Recode: 124-126 72 Category Recode: 820
Homocide 113 Category Recode: 127-130 72 Category Recode: 830
Notes: The ninth revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) corresponds with
1998 data and the tenth revision with 1999-2008 data. To group deaths into the above 6 categories,
I use either the actual ICD code or a recode of ICD codes grouped into categories. In particular,
I use the the 283 category and 72 category recodes corresponding with ICD-9 codes and the 113
category recode corresponding with ICD-10 codes.
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TABLE 25. Unweighted Estimated Effects of Treatment Facilities on Drug-Induced
Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Facilities -0.058*** -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.031***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
County and Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
State by Year FE no yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls no no yes yes yes
Controls for Economic Conditions no no no yes yes
Controls for Law Enforcement/Crime no no no no yes
Counties 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062
Mean 8.500 8.500 8.500 8.500 8.500
% Impact 0.677 0.484 0.415 0.362 0.367
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s annual drug-induced mortality rate per 100,000
residents. Demographic controls include the fraction of the county population that are: white,
black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old. Controls for
economic conditions include the unemployment rate, firm births, and per-capita income. Controls
for law enforcement and crime include the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per
100,000 residents. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment facilities in a county by year.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 26. Poisson Estimates of the Effect of Treatment Facilities on Drug-Induced
Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Facilities -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County and Year FE yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls no yes yes yes
Controls for Economic Conditions no no yes yes
Controls for Law Enforcement/Crime no no no yes
Counties 2,384 2,384 2,384 2,384
County-Year Observations 23,812 23,812 23,812 23,812
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s annual number of drug-induced deaths. Demographic
controls include county population and the fraction of the county population that are: white,
black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old. Controls for
economic conditions include the unemployment rate, firm births, and per-capita income. Controls
for law enforcement and crime include the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per
100,000 residents. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment facilities in a county by year.
Huber-White robust estimates of the standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 27. Estimated effect of Facilities on Drug-Induced Mortality using Lags and
Leads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Facilitiest−2 -0.021***
(0.006)
Number of Facilitiest−1 -0.038*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of Facilitiest -0.015** -0.010
(0.007) (0.007)
Number of Facilitiest+1 0.000
(0.009)
Counties 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062 21,653 24,062 21,653
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s annual drug-induced mortality rate per 100,000
residents. County-by-year controls include the unemployment rate, firm births, per-capita income,
the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per 100,000, and the fraction of the county
population that are: white, black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than 64
years old. The estimates are weighted by county population and standard errors (in parentheses)
are corrected for possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 28. Estimated Effects of Covariates on the Number of Facilities
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged Firm Births 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003)
Lagged Per-Capita Income 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Unemployment Rate -0.509 -0.506
(0.391) (0.391)
Lagged Employed Officers -0.008 -0.007
(0.006) (0.005)
Lagged Crime Rate 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
County and State-by-Year FE yes yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes
Counties 2,409 2,409 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062 24,062 24,062
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s number of substance-abuse treatment facilities.
Demographic controls include the fraction of the county population that are: white, black, male,
less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old. The estimates are weighted
by county population and standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for possible clustering at
the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 29. The Effect of Facilities on Alcohol Poisoning Deaths Across Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All <10 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+
Number of Facilities -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Counties 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062
Mean 0.226 0.000902 0.0509 0.189 0.319 0.511 0.421 0.199 0.0726 0.0278
% Impact 0.690 0.694 0.876 0.763 0.244 0.783 0.649 1.910 3.405 1.391
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s age-adjusted drug-induced mortality rate per 100,000
residents. County-by-year controls include the unemployment rate, firm births, per-capita income,
the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per 100,000 residents, and the fraction of
the county population that are: white, black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and
greater than 64 years old. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment facilities in a county by
year. The estimates are weighted by county population and standard errors (in parentheses) are
corrected for possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 30. Estimated Effects on Gender and Race Using Counties with Larger Black
Populations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all blacks whites other male female
Facility -0.041*** -0.066*** -0.044*** -0.002 -0.057*** -0.026***
(0.009) (0.022) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
Counties 803 803 803 803 803 803
County-Year Observations 8,014 8,014 8,014 8,012 8,014 8,014
Mean 9.463 8.157 10.53 2.220 12.60 6.495
% Impact 0.437 0.811 0.417 0.0774 0.450 0.405
Notes: The sample is limited to counties within the highest tercile of proportion of county
residents that are black (greater than 8 percent black). The dependent variables area county’s
annual demographic-specific drug-induced mortality rate per 100,000 residents corresponding to
each column heading. County-by-year controls include the unemployment rate, firm births, per-
capita income, the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per 100,000 residents, and
the fraction of the county population that are: white, black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64
years old, and greater than 64 years old. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment facilities
in a county by year. The estimates are weighted by county population and standard errors (in
parentheses) are corrected for possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 31. Estimated Effects of Treatment Facilities on Other Causes of Death
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Drug-Induced All Deaths Non Drug-Induced Cardiov Cancer Infection / Immune Disease MV Acc Suicide Homicide Other
Panel A: All Ages
Number of Facilities -0.038*** -0.098 -0.055 0.011 0.004 -0.030*** -0.019 0.002 -0.008*** -0.018*** 0.003
(0.005) (0.063) (0.062) (0.028) (0.014) (0.010) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.014)
Counties 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062
Mean 9.390 828.2 811.0 301.2 195.3 26.90 150.9 14.70 9.523 6.252 106.2
% Impact 0.402 0.0119 0.00679 0.00363 0.00181 0.110 0.0128 0.0134 0.0796 0.290 0.00302
Panel B: Ages less than 65
Number of Facilities -0.041*** -0.104*** -0.062*** -0.006 -0.002 -0.016** -0.009*** 0.002 -0.011*** -0.022*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.019) (0.018) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.010)
Counties 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409
County-Year Observations 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062 24,062
Mean 10.31 249.9 239.5 58.14 67.20 11.54 19.91 15.98 9.547 7.576 49.92
% Impact 0.400 0.0414 0.0260 0.00963 0.00368 0.138 0.0432 0.00956 0.111 0.290 0.00308
Notes: The dependent variable is a county’s annual mortality rate per 100,000 residents corresponding
to each column title. County-by-year controls include the unemployment rate, firm births, per-capita
income, the number of law enforcement officers and total crimes per 100,000 residents, and the fraction
of the county population that are: white, black, male, less than 18 years old, 18-64 years old, and
greater than 64 years old. Number of Facilities is the count of treatment facilities in a county by year.
The estimates are weighted by county population and standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for
possible clustering at the county level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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